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A number of scholars have recently critiqued the traditional search-costs
model of trademark infringement doctrine and have proposed alternatives
driven by consumer decision-making theories and contractarian
understandings of trademarks. While I agree that the search-costs model is
problematic in parts, some of the other suggested frameworks suffer from
difficulties of their own. For one, these alternative approaches draw up a
dichotomy between "pure" experiences of trademarked goods as opposed to
"altered" experiences, with the latter representing the mindsets of consumers
after trademark owners have influenced them via advertising and other devices
in an effort to build up goodwill. This Article posits, however, that this binary
setup most reminiscent of the decision between the red pill and the blue pill in
the movie The Matrix-with one standing for the "truth" about trademarked
products and the other a 'fake reality" filled with manufactured perceptions
about goods-is a false choice. Indeed, in today's world, many goods and their
brands have become inextricably tied with one another and consumers
experience the two together. In that sense, it is not necessarily relevant
whether consumers prefer Pepsi to Coke when no labels are attached because
we may actually be interested in human experience and level of hedonic
benefits as a whole, and labels do enter that holistic perception. Hedonic
harms to consumers, should they be of sufficient magnitude, could prove
significant for doctrines such as dilution and post-sale confusion because
intellectual property may become rivalrous and consumers' experience of the
original goods has the potential to suffer even when search costs do not
increase. In short, the model presented here tries to resolve the tension
between the information transmission conception of trademarks, which seeks
to protect consumers from deception, and the misappropriation theory, which
focuses on producers' investments in goodwill. This Article shows how a
robust trademark system must account for the possibility that producers serve
as providers of hedonic values to consumers. A trademark system that seeks to
maximize global hedonic and economic utility would need to include First
Amendment-based safe harbors such as criticism and parody. In this context,
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deeper empirical exploration of hedonic trade-offs is likely to become an
important source of information in drawing the contours of trademark law.
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"You create the world of the dream, you bring the subject into that dream, and
they fill it with their subconscious."I
I. INTRODUCTION
Many individuals' notion is that products are divided between the things
that we "actually" need and those that advertising convinces us to want.2
1 INCEPTION (Warner Brothers Pictures 2010).2 Herbert Marcuse deemed this the creation of "false needs." HERBERT MARCUSE,
ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 4-
5 (1964). See generally PAMELA WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: AMERICAN
BUSINESS AND THE RISE OF CONSUMER MARKETING (1998) (linking the advancement of
advertising with the modernization of society); VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS
(2007) (providing the best-known critique of the early uses of motivation research to
influence consumer desires); JOSEPH J. SELDIN, THE GOLDEN FLEECE: SELLING THE GOOD
LIFE TO AMERICANS (1963) (providing a historical account of advertising); Ellen P.
Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEx. L. REV. 83, 104-05 (2006)
(describing economic and psychological critiques of advertising); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing
Brands, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 1245, 1295-1313 (2011) (cautioning against producers'
manipulation of consumers and calling for regulatory solutions). But see Raymond A. Bauer,
Limits of Persuasion, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1958, at 105, 106-07 (criticizing Vance
Packard's arguments about companies' ability to sway consumers and arguing in part that
"[a]s the persuaders become more sophisticated, so do the people to be persuaded"); see also
GERALD ZALTMAN, HOW CUSTOMERS THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF THE
MARKET 127 (2003) (calling Vance Packard's work "highly misleading"). For a parody of
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Similarly, when it comes to branded goods, a great number of people believe
that there is one form of perception that we would have of a brand based purely
on our experience of the goods as contrasted with the perception that we adopt
as a blend of our "real" experience and the sometimes misleading or at least
exaggerating input of advertising.3 These dichotomies are reflected in the
popular media, from literary representations 4 to successful motion pictures. The
public's fascination with alternate realities remains unabated, from Neo's
choice in The Matrix between the red pill that represents the real world and the
blue pill that would send him back to a virtual reality controlled by machines, 5
to the more recent choice in the movie Inception between reality and several
other dimensions consisting of dream states.6 Other movies have focused on
changing characters' perceptions by altering their memories, whether by erasing
negative memories of the past like in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind or
creating positive memories that had not been present previously like in Total
Recall.8 The closest analogy to the advertising-related dichotomies, however,
may be The Truman Show, where Jim Carrey's character breaks out of the
manufactured televised world in which he has grown up and in which some
moments he perceives as real are actually commercials for the viewers at
home.9
the 1960s advertising industry and fictionalized accounts of related themes, see the series
Mad Men (AMC television broadcast 2007).
3 See, e.g., JoAndrea Hoegg & Joseph W. Alba, Taste Perception: More than Meets
the Tongue, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 490 (2007) (discussing consumers' significant preference
for the taste of orange juice labeled with a nationally known brand as opposed to a store
brand although both samples consisted of the juice with the former brand). For an example
of the use of branding to promote healthier lifestyle choices, see Brian Wansink et al., Can
Branding Improve School Lunches?, 166 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 967,
968 (2012).
4See, e.g., DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, INFINITE JEST (1996); GREEN PEYTON
WERTENBAKER, THE CHAMBER OF LIFE (1929), available at http://generation.
feedbooks.com/book/2585.pdf.
5 THE MATRIX (Warner Brothers Pictures 1999).
6 INCEPTION, supra note 1.
7 ETERNAL SUNSHINE OF THE SPOTLESS MIND (Universal Pictures 2004). Adam Kolber
has written about the issues surrounding memory-dampening drugs in the legal context.
Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory
Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006). The erosion of identity associated with memory
loss has been explored in a number of works, including in the literary realm. See, e.g., RAY
BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451, at 40 (1953) ("[I]f she died, he was certain he wouldn't cry.
For it would be the dying of an unknown, a street face, a newspaper image, and it was
suddenly so very wrong that he had begun to cry, not at death but at the thought of not
crying at death . . . ").
8 TOTAL RECALL (TriStar Pictures 1990). A remake of the movie came out last year
whose poster quizzically asks "What Is Real?" See Total Recall, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/ttl386703/ (last visited April 20, 2013).
9 THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount Pictures 1998). This and other movies may have
even influenced the delusional, often paranoid, beliefs of psychiatric patients who believe
that their lives are being filmed and shown to an audience for its entertainment. Joel Gold &
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Robert Nozick explores this idea of what he terms the "experience
machine" in his work Anarchy, State, and Utopia.'0 Nozick presents the
following thought experiment: imagine that we could choose between living our
real lives and plugging into a machine that induces pleasurable experiences
indistinguishable from reality-would we, given the choice, decide to be
hooked up to such a machine as opposed to continuing with our real lives?" He
concludes that we should refuse to plug into the machine because we want not
only experiences but rather the ability to perform actions, because we would
like to be a particular kind of individual, and because the machine sets limits on
the types of things that we can experience.12 This Article will argue, however,
that in the world of branded goods, there is no actual way to step out of the
experience machine. It will show that experiencing a good for its "inherent"
qualities is elusive and that our perceptions are necessarily subject to outside
influences that our brain incorporates into the experience of products.13
Consumers can gain a variety of hedonic enjoyments from using goods with a
specific brand, including experiencing emotions tied to the mental associations
that arise from the history or the marketing of the brand, acquiring the ability to
convey elements of identity or status, and so on.14 Hence, this Article will show
that there is hardly such a thing as experiencing a product apart from its brand
and that the mainstream understandings of trademarks have all been incomplete
to a greater or lesser degree because they have disregarded this state of affairs.
As part of its project, this Article will seek to resolve a long-standing
tension in trademark law between the information transmission model, which
posits that the law should protect consumers' interests against deception and
inferior goods, and the not-always-compatible misappropriation model, which
views the goal of the law as protecting the goodwill in which producers have
invested.'5 The questions that arise on the way to developing such a framework
challenge us to consider the fundamental aims of trademark law. The
conversations about whether the law is truly "about" consumers or producers-
while very important in their own right-have to some extent obfuscated the
matter of the ultimate prescriptive objective of a trademark system. Consistent
Ian Gold, The "Truman Show" Delusion: Psychosis in the Global Village, 17 COGNITIVE
NEUROPSYCHIATRY 455, 456 (2012).
10 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42 (1974).
11Id
12d. at 43. At the same time, people can experience things in virtual worlds that they
cannot when unplugged. I thank Eric Goldman for his comments on this subject.
13 That being said, this Article does not endorse the view that individuals live in a
world that consists of multiple realities. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1966).
14I would like to thank Laura Heymann for her comments on this point.15 See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2006) (discussing the friction between these two
theories and stating that "the information transmission model has no need for the idea of
goodwill at all").
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with my previous work, 16 I situate the endeavor of intellectual property law as a
whole and of each of its branches individually in a scheme oriented toward the
maximization of societal utility. I take a broad view of the forms of utility that
we should count in this calculus and include both economic components and
other types of gratification such as emotional rewards. This understanding fits
in with the emerging literature on the role of hedonic values in legal analysis
and the importance of considering the role of the law on personal happiness
rather than only financial well-being.' 7 Accordingly, I "equate human welfare
with the subjective, individual experience of positive feeling. On this view, the
measure of welfare for a period of any duration, from a couple of minutes to an
entire lifetime, is the aggregate of a person's moment-by-moment experiences
of positive and negative feeling."' 8 I will show how trademarks fit into and can
maximize this understanding of welfare.19
I posit that difficult empirical inquiries will litter any path that we choose to
take in framing trademark law, and that we must not let fear of imperfection
regarding the eventual outcome paralyze our thinking in this regard.20 Unlike
some other scholars, I view trademarks as part of a similar creation incentives
paradigm as other forms of intellectual property such as copyright and patents
even though we might not have strong grounds to "affirmatively encourage the
creation of new brands" 21 per se. Indeed, consumers experience goods and
161 used this understanding of the foundations of intellectual property most recently in
Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REv. 1303 (2012).
17 This approach has prominently been championed in the works of John Bronsteen,
Chris Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur. See John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98
GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen et al., Welfare]; John Bronsteen et al., Well-
Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter
Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1989202. See generally LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein eds., 2010). For a contemporary social critique of hedonic analyses, see Deirdre N.
McCloskey, Happyism, NEW REPUBLIC (June 8, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/
article/politics/magazine/103952/happyism-deirdre-mccloskey-economics-happiness.
18 Bronsteen et al., Welfare, supra note 17, at 1591.
19As one author and marketing consultant quipped: "[Consumers] don't devote
themselves to brands because they want to provide free marketing for corporations. They do
it because some special brands offer up a vision that people can identify with, one that they
want to involve themselves in more deeply." ALEX WIPPERFORTH, BRAND HUACK:
MARKETING WITHOUT MARKETING 7 (2005).
20 A similar point has been made in the context of measuring happiness in the legal
context generally. See Bronsteen et al., Welfare, supra note 17, at 1611 ("Even if it were true
that pleasure is a hopelessly messy and complicated phenomenon, comprising innumerable
different shades of feeling and including even certain sorts of painful emotions, that would
not invalidate the project of measuring subjective well-being and trying to promote it.").
21 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REv. 137,
141 (2010); see also William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse,
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1560 (2006) ("[D]istinctive marks do not suffer any kind of
public goods problem: their creation is nearly costless and, to a large extent, they are their
own reward."). But see Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1060 (2006) ("On
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trademarks so holistically (such as in studies in which different labels greatly
affected the reported enjoyment of certain products like wines and beers) 22 that
the robustness of the trademark system could well influence the level of
creation and sale of the goods themselves. And there is little question that this is
a significant matter of concern for the economy and general welfare. While
other scholars have written about the role of trademarks themselves as
commodities or parts thereof,23 this Article explicitly ties that realization to
consumer experience and suggests that we draw doctrinal conclusions
accordingly.
The Article will first focus on the three main strands that have dominated
the thinking on trademarks in recent years, namely the search-costs theory, the
consumer-choice theory, and the contractarian theory. It will demonstrate that
[Congress's] view, famous marks present a classic public goods problem. The cost of
creating a public good-in this case a valuable mark with positive consumer associations-
is high, but once the public good is created the cost to third parties of using it is low."). Part
of the disagreement here may be rooted in different understandings of what it means to
create a trademark. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZo L. REv. 105, 166 (2005) (distinguishing
between the creation of a mark and the investments spent in advertising and marketing to
increase its value). For a public goods analysis of copyrightable works, see generally
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007).
22 A stark example of this phenomenon is a study in which subjects drank the same
wine that was labeled as coming either from California or North Dakota, and the subjects
who drank the wine with the former label rated both the actual wine and accompanying food
as significantly better than the other group did. See Brian Wansink et al., Fine as North
Dakota Wine: Sensory Expectations and the Intake of Companion Foods, 90 PHYSIOLOGY &
BEHAV. 712, 713-15 (2007). In an earlier experiment involving beer, researchers found
label-indiced differences on some of the measures they used. See Ralph I. Allison &
Kenneth P. Uhl, Influence ofBeer Brand Identification on Taste Perception, 1 J. MARKETING
RES. 36, 37-39 (1964). But see G. A. Mauser, Allison & Uhl Revisited: The Effects of Taste
and Brand Name on Perceptions and Preferences, 6 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 161, 164-
65 (1979) (failing to fully replicate the results of Allison and Uhl's study and attributing that
difference to variations in the methodology and the range of stimuli used).
23 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV.
621, 624 (2004) ("[F]irms produce trademarks as status goods,.. .consumers consume
trademarks to signal status, and .. .courts routinely invest trademarks with legal protection
in an effort to preserve this status-signaling function. The culture industries-and what
industries aren't?-have long sold trademarks as commodities in their own right."); Deven
R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981 (2012) (describing the
relationship between trademarks, brands, and products); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 397, 402 (1990) (terming the value of trademarks above that of signifiers "surplus
value"); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1728-29 (1999) (discussing the meaning of the increased value of
trademarks); Rothman, supra note 21, at 125 n.63 ("Trademarks have in some instances
become the commodities themselves rather than signifiers of a producer of the good or
service, or of the product itself. For example, the Nike swoosh is valuable separate and apart
from the running shoes that were first marked with the trademarked swoosh.").
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the search-costs theory is incomplete, as scholars have pointed out, and does not
comport with some of the existing trademark doctrines. It will also show that
the consumer-choice theory runs into an important obstacle, which is its
reluctance to acknowledge that any choice relies on the existence of desirable
elements from which an individual can choose. Finally, it will demonstrate that
the contractarian theory contains great internal tensions and ultimately struggles
to meet its goal to escape the empirical problems of other models. This Article
will then present a view of the law grounded in the psychological experience of
trademarks. It will use research from cognitive psychology and marketing to
provide an approach that explains the shape of trademark doctrine that we see
today. As part of this endeavor, it will help to clear up one commonly accepted
misconception: that all intellectual property is necessarily non-rivalrous. 24
This point is worth foreshadowing here. Imagine that a fast-food chain
begins selling "Gucci burgers." 25 Because the fast-food and fashion industries
exhibit little overlap, consumers are unlikely to be confused by this use of the
Gucci name, which will preclude a finding of direct, so-called point-of-sale
trademark infringement.26 It is also difficult to believe that search costs will rise
24For a discussion of the role of rivalry in the economic analysis of intellectual
property law, see John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price
Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801 (2009); Christopher S.
Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 246-48 (2004).
25 There is actually at least one place that does sell precisely that, namely a pub called
"The Bag and Kettle" located in a Maine ski resort. See Eric, The Bag and Kettle in
Sugarloaf Maine, SKI MONSTER BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://theskimonster.com/
blog/posts/the-bag-and-kettle-sugarloaf-maine/. I would like to thank Eric Goldman for our
conversation on this point. A recent actual lawsuit involving the unlicensed use of a famous
fashion mark, this time in advertising, came up in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai
Motor America, No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012 WL 1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012),
where the court found in favor of Louis Vuitton on a dilution claim after a Hyundai
television commercial used a brief shot of a basketball adorned with a pattern similar to
LV's toile monogram on a chestnut-brown background. For a discussion of the case, see Eric
Goldman, Brief Brand Reference in TV Ad Constitutes Trademark Dilution-Louis Vuitton
v. Hyundai, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012, 8:55 AM), http://
blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/04/brief brand par.htm; Rebecca Tushnet, Delayed but
Long Post on LV v. Hyundai, REBECCA TUSHNET'S 43(B)LOG (May 30, 2012, 9:20 AM),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/05/delayed-but-long-post-on-lv-v-hyundai.html.
26 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (2006) (requiring that the use of a mark be "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" for a finding of infringement). That being said,
(1) some consumers may actually be confused and (2) while there may not be high levels of
confusion at this stage, this could change if high-end designers enter the fast-food market. A
designer has actually proposed a campaign called "McFancy," which would place temporary
McDonald's stores at the most upscale "Fashion Weeks" events and would be "part art
installation, gathering spot and, of course, a restaurant that offers a traditional McDonald's
menu but packaged in a way that makes a playful yet stylish nod to the lifestyle of the highly
desirable, influential consumers that attend Fashion Weeks." McFancy McDonald's by
TCH/Access Agency, COOL HUNTER (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.thecoolhunter.net/article/
detail/l 682/mcfancy-and-mcmagic-by-access-agency. The pictures accompanying the story
suggest that these stores would include items such as fries labeled Hermes and Gucci,
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in any meaningful way; after all, consumers are unlikely to expend more time
on finding Gucci fashion products just because they saw or perhaps even ate a
Gucci burger. There is nothing particularly offensive about burgers, so a claim
for tarnishment is unlikely to stand.27 And yet, many people experience
instinctual discomfort about the idea of having Gucci burgers in the
marketplace. I suspect that this discomfort goes beyond an opposition to free
riding, and scholars have in fact ably explained why free riding by itself should
not be legally actionable.28 The reason that the idea of Gucci burgers irks
people may lie in the possibility that consumers can no longer experience Gucci
purses with the same level of satisfaction after having seen some critical
number of Gucci burgers. Moreover, the concern is that a potential reduction in
satisfaction (and hence, I would argue, in utility) occurs without a genuine
accompanying increase in the type of expression that the First Amendment
seeks to protect,29 unlike in situations where a mark is used as part of parody or
commentary. 30 Especially in the case of status goods, society may thus suffer a
global loss of utility if the upshots of Gucci burgers are minimal: the relative
social increase in pleasure of devouring a Gucci as opposed to a differently
branded burger may not make up for the social decreases in pleasure associated
with the consumption of the original Gucci goods.3' This effect would only be
compounded over time, with each additional Gucci-branded good bringing
pleasures of lesser and lesser increase to the consumer and continuing to
Burberry burgers, and Paul Smith sundaes. See id. I would like to thank Will Baude for
drawing my attention to this project.
27The Lanham Act defines dilution by tamishment as "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006). A number of the cases that successfully
made tarnishment claims revolved around uses related to drugs, sex, or nudity. See GRAEME
B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND
POLICY 625-35 (3d ed. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Toys "R" Us, Inc., v. Akkaoui, No. C96-
3381CW, 1996 WL 772709 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996) (granting preliminary injunction to the
plaintiff based on the defendant's use of the website name and shopping service "Adults 'R'
Us," which sold an assortment of sexual devices and clothing)).28 See discussion infra Part III.A. 1.
291t is understood that criticism of a brand could easily bring about greater hedonic loss
to a brand than a competitive use would, but we generally allow such criticism due to the
offsetting benefit to society of having this type of discourse. I would like to thank Bill
McGeveran for his comments on this point.
30 For a discussion of non-deceptive trademark infringement and the First Amendment,
see infra Part III.C.
31 Or, as Rebecca Tushnet put it, "[W]hat good does the existence of Buick aspirin do
for anyone?" Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 507, 554 (2008). The psychology literature further shows that
people would rather forego a gain than suffer a loss of the exact same magnitude. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
341, 342 (1984). Absent an overwhelmingly larger gain on the part of Gucci burger
consumers than the corresponding loss for original Gucci consumers, this may also militate
against allowing Gucci burgers to exist, although this issue merits deeper study.
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decrease pleasure to the consumer of Gucci fashion goods.32 This Article
responds to the fact that the mainstream trademark theories have not captured
the problem of such possible hedonic (in addition to potentially economic)
losses. Scholars have criticized dilution doctrine for many years33 and
questioned the existence of harm in dilution cases,34 and they have eyed other
areas of the law such as post-sale confusion with suspicion as well. 35 This
Article provides a possible answer as to how these doctrines relate to a world in
which the experiences of goods versus experiences of brands have become more
impossible to disaggregate than ever. Understanding these mechanisms is
crucial to effectively grapple both with current doctrine and determine its future
course as consumers' experiences of brands evolve. In short, the possibility of
hedonic harm matters, we must attempt to measure it empirically, and we must
evaluate to what extent the trademark system can reduce it without creating
offsetting hedonic harms and other costs in the process.
The Article will begin by critiquing in Part II the existing principal theories
of trademark infringement doctrine and will show how they face significant
tensions and do not capture the experiential component of trademarked goods.
Part III will first discuss the concept of free riding in trademark law and then
provide an alternative understanding of modern trademark doctrine that
accounts for the hedonic experience of branded products. This Part will also
respond to potential concerns about the hedonic model. Part IV will conclude.
32 See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
33 While dilution by blurring and by tarnishment often receive separate treatment, this
Article will generally refer to them together because both phenomena could cause similar
harm that differs more in degree than in kind (blurring is understood as the weakening of the
mark through the mechanism of diffusion, and tamishment as diffusion and addition of
negative connotations). See Long, supra note 21, at 1036-37 (describing the contents and
roots of the doctrines of blurring and tarnishment). The Santa Clara Computer & High
Technology Law Journal devoted a symposium issue to the topic of dilution several years
ago, which is available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol24/iss3/.
34 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 31, at 536 (arguing that "dilution does not harm many
famous trademarks because adding associations to low-frequency words does not interfere
with retrieval or recognition"); see also Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the
Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REv. 809, 848-59 (2010) (discussing the failure of
antidilution laws to fulfill their stated goals); Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of
Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32
CARDozo L. REv. 2533, 2575 (2011) (expressing skepticism about the concept of harm from
dilution); Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 447 (1994) (calling dilution "a
remedy without a wrong").
35 Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REv. 769, 804-30 (2012) (criticizing
the doctrine of post-sale confusion on the basis of policy and First Amendment arguments).
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II. CRITIQUES OF TRADITIONAL AND RECENT TRADEMARK THEORIES
A. The Search-Costs Model
The search-costs story of trademarks and of its related infringement
doctrines is probably the best known of all in this context. 36 The theory posits
that consumers will expend the optimal amount of time on finding the products
that they seek if a well-functioning system of trademarks provides information
as to the source and the quality of any given good.37 While the former function
of source identification prevailed in ancient times,38 the quality function later
predominated in its importance. 39 In short, in this model, a trademark
overcomes the problem of information asymmetry that stems from producers'
superior knowledge of their goods, and "[t]he economic role of the trademark is
to help the consumer identify the unobservable features of the trademarked
product."40 Put differently, instead of researching the attributes of every good to
determine whether it corresponds to or resembles a previously experienced or
recommended brand, a consumer expends a lower cost by simply looking for a
specific trademark and making purchases accordingly. 41 Trademark law thus
"aims to promote rigorous, truthful competition in the marketplace by
36 Mark McKenna has stated that "it would be nearly impossible to overstate the extent
to which the search-costs theory now dominates as the theoretical justification of trademark
law." Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA.
L. REV. 67, 75 (2012) [hereinafter McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory]. Of
course, a number of other theories describing trademark doctrine have been developed over
time, including McKenna's own account of trademarks as a device to primarily protect
producers' rather than consumers' interests. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007); see also Beebe,
supra note 23 (explaining the trademark law framework as a sign system).
37 The best known formal exposition of this model originated in the work of Bill
Landes and Richard Posner. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166-209 (2003); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON.
265 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Trademark Law]. See generally Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525-27 (1988).
38 See, e.g., Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 813, 814 (1927).
39 Economides, supra note 37, at 527. Schechter already pointed out in the 1920s that
consumers in the modem economy actually often do not truly know the origin of a good,
which is a sign that the source-identifying role of trademarks has withered. Schechter, supra
note 38, at 814-15.40 Economides, supra note 37, at 526.
41 Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 269. These authors also point
out that there is a lowered cost to asking for "Sanka" as opposed to "the decaffeinated coffee
made by General Foods." Id. at 268-69; see also John F. Coverdale, Comment, Trademarks
and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHLI. L. REV. 868, 869-70 (1984)
(viewing trademarks as a tool that enables consumers to distinguish between different
producers' goods).
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preserving the clarity of the language of trade." 42 The courts have explicitly
endorsed this view of trademarks when explaining the problems that result from
infringement.43
Indeed, search-costs theory provides a powerful explanatory tool for
numerous real and hypothetical situations of infringement. To give a blatant
example, if several brown carbonated sodas that taste completely differently
from one another are all sold with Coca-Cola labels, consumers will have
significant difficulty locating the product that they originally associated with
this brand if they wish to do so.44 Once potential disappointment sets in after
buying and drinking soda that turns out to be different, a customer may also
refuse to take the risk again in the future and will shy away from sodas with the
Coca-Cola label as this designation has proven misleading in the past.
Consumers generally experience a reduction in overall utility in these types of
situations. This problem translates to clothes or furniture that turn out less
durable than anticipated based on specific labels or, in more extreme situations,
to cases in which products reveal themselves as downright dangerous as a result
of trademark infringement. One such example would be counterfeit drugs that
either fail to treat disease or actively harm patients through their ingredients. 45
While not all trademark infringement has caused actual harm by the time
litigation occurs, demonstrating likelihood of confusion suffices for a plaintiff
to emerge victorious. 46 The reasons behind this test are manifold but include the
desire of the legal system to prevent harm if its likelihood is sufficiently high,
and also the wish to optimize enforcement costs.47
Mark McKenna attributes the popularity of the search-costs theory to a
number of factors, including the general dominance of the law and economics
movement as well as the theory's focus on consumers. 48 He explains, however,
that the recent expansion of trademark doctrines such as initial interest
confusion, reverse confusion, post-sale confusion, and confusion as to
affiliation and sponsorship-unwelcome developments according to many
42 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines
in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1226 (2007). For a more extensive collection
of articles that discuss various aspects of search-costs theory, see McKenna, Consumer
Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 75 n. 16.
4 3 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)
(describing the importance of reducing search costs when consumers seek products by the
same manufacturers as those the consumers have experienced in the past).
44 Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REv. 2099,
2106 (2004). Indeed, less successful competitors have an incentive to use the popular Coca-
Cola mark specifically to attract consumers to their own products. Id
4 5 Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 502 (2011).
46 For the best known test of trademark infringement, which has been replicated with
slight variations in other circuits, see Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961).
4 7 See Bone, supra note 44.4 8 McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 76-77.
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intellectual property scholars--can be in part traced to the search-costs model.49
McKenna states that the adherents of the search-costs theory tend to conflate
any type of trademark confusion with an increase of costs in purchasing
decisions, which is particularly inaccurate when it comes to confusion related to
some non-competing goods; second, McKenna argues, searches and their costs
are only a part of the purchasing process, and trademark theory should focus on
the latter as a global matter rather than over-emphasize the search aspect.5 0
Psychologists have attempted to connect the search-costs model to legal
doctrines such as dilution as part of what Rebecca Tushnet has dubbed an
"internal" version of the model--one focused on examining the cognitive
underpinnings of the consumers' experience of blurring.5' The basis of this
understanding is the so-called associative network theory, which holds that
information stored in long-term memory consists of networks containing nodes
(concepts) connected by links (relations or associations). The associations
include relations such as category membership and the possession of attributes.
During memory retrieval, when a particular node is activated, a fixed amount
of activation is hypothesized to spread outward along all links connected to
that node. If the amount of activation that travels outward along a link to a
connected node (e.g., for a product category) is sufficient to reach the
connected node's threshold level of activation, that node is brought from long-
term memory into working memory; that is, the person retrieves that
information and becomes conscious of it. When additional associations are
added to a preexisting network, the speed of retrieval is typically slowed,
especially if the information bears little semantic relatedness to that already
existing in the network. 52
Unlike for cases of trademark dilution, however, additional nodes that
consist of brand extensions can actually improve retrieval, possibly because
activation survives within the network of a single brand. 53 In short, when it
comes to dilution, if Hyatt Legal Services begins competing with Hyatt Hotels,
upon hearing the name "Hyatt" consumers may begin activating a network in
their minds associated with the legal services in a way that will impede retrieval
of the hotel network; this would decrease the strength of the original Hyatt mark
and could even completely eradicate it if Hyatt Legal Services becomes popular
4 9 Id at 78-79.
50 1d. at 83-84.
51 Tushnet, supra note 31, at 518.5 2 Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an
Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 267 (2000); see also Alexander F.
Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to Judge
"Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 152-61 (1993) (explaining a similar
mechanism for dilution).
53 Maureen Morrin, The Impact of Brand Extensions on Parent Brand Memory
Structures and Retrieval Processes, 36 J. MARKETING REs. 517, 520 (1999).
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enough that the "Hyatt" name leads to mental retrieval of the legal services
only. 54
Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby conducted a series of experiments to test
this theory and found that diluting uses by junior users can decrease the
accuracy and somewhat the speed of retrieval of information about the senior
user, and that dilutive uses reduce category recall of senior users while
increasing that of junior users.55 Morrin and Jacoby's methodologies have
received their share of criticism, including for the questionable size of the
effects they observed (e.g., information recall differences of only milliseconds)
and lack of clarity about the applicability of their findings to actual consumer
decisions in the marketplace. 56 If dilution or for that matter initial interest
confusion or post-sale confusion do not significantly increase search costs or
general enforcement costs,57 does and should this mean that they lose their
justification? After reviewing some of the other (albeit less) dominant views of
trademark doctrine, this Article will give an account of the function of marks
that supplements the understanding that search-costs theory provides.
B. The Consumer Decision-Making Theory
In response to what he perceives as the significant flaws of search-costs
theory and inspired by false advertising law, Mark McKenna has proposed a
reconceptualization of trademark law to refocus it on deceptive actions
that interfere with consumers' purchasing decisions. . .. [According to
McKenna,] courts should find trademark infringement only when the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark creates a risk that consumers will
be deceived into buying goods or services they otherwise would not have or
refraining from buying what they otherwise would have.58
In a number of situations involving confusion between products that are
direct competitors, such as in the Coca-Cola example, McKenna explains that
search-costs theory and his consumer decision-making theory yield the same
result; he is, however, combating the idea that just because consumer confusion
increases search costs when it comes to competing goods, all confusion
necessarily generates additional search costs and hence, trademark law needs to
54 Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 52, at 267-68. For a collection of legal scholarly
articles discussing dilution theory as part of an increase of mental burdens and search costs,
see McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 109 n. 124.
55 Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 52, at 274.
56 Tushnet, supra note 31, at 528-32. But see Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution,
and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1238 n.40 (2008) (explaining
that research methodologies have become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to
measure likely behavior in the marketplace).
57 See Bone, supra note 44 (discussing the relevance of enforcement costs to the
optimal delineation of substantive trademark rights).5 8 McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 72.
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punish all confusion to keep search costs loW.59 His view rests on the major
requirement, however, that "trademark law should treat consumers' preferences
as essentially fixed and exogenous to the trademark system, and courts should
intervene only where a use threatens to prevent a consumer from acting on those
preferences."60 This understanding, however, is potentially in tension with what
McKenna calls "the close relationship between trademark and false advertising
law."61
Indeed, this is where the experience machine enters the picture. As
McKenna notes, advertising not only transmits information but also creates new
desires on the part of consumers. 62 As a result of the deep relationship between
marks and advertising, as well as other factors, people genuinely have different
physiological responses to some products than others. For example, brain scans
reveal that even though Pepsi might win out in blind taste tests, individuals who
drink Coke have a different cerebral experience when drinking branded as
opposed to unbranded Coke; similarly, women's heart rates increase by twenty
percent if they see a blue Tiffany box.63 While McKenna raises concerns as to
the consumerist and status-signaling function of brands in some of these
contexts, he also states that "[t]o tell consumers they cannot have the emotional
or experiential value they derive from brands because it is not 'real' is
remarkably paternalistic, and it implies that consumers are fools incapable of
determining what they want." 64 McKenna's consumer decision-making theory
centers on the concept that the law should only intervene in cases of deception,
and he is consequently skeptical of doctrines such as initial interest confusion,
post-sale confusion, sponsorship confusion, and dilution.65 One of the examples
he uses in the dilution context is the Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute
Diggity Dog, LLC case,66 in which a company named Chewy Vuitton created
and sold dog toys whose designs imitated Louis Vuitton's fashion products. 67
Under McKenna's theory, such use likely would not have been actionable even
59 Id. at 82-83.
60 1d at 73; see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62
STAN. L. REV. 413, 414-16 (2010) (arguing that courts should presumptively view confusion
about source or quality as relevant, but that other forms of confusion should have an impact
on litigation outcome only if they materially affect consumers' purchasing decisions).
61 McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 113 (citing
Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1305, 1312 (2011)).
621d at 114-15.
631d. at 118-19.
64 1d. at 120; see also Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis
for Protecting "Irrational Beliefs, " 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 605, 622 (2007) (arguing that
trademarks sometimes serve to increase personal utility in private rather than only
functioning as signaling devices).65 McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 125-36.
66 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).67 McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 36, at 135 (citing Louis
Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 258).
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minus the parody defense that succeeded in the actual case, because the case
was not about consumer deception but rather a threat to change the meaning of
the mark.68
This is where the model in this Article parts ways with McKenna's theory
because it appears that the latter relies on a key assumption whose
consequences are then not necessarily integrated into his conclusions on
dilution and other non-confusion-based doctrines. Specifically, any consumer
decision-making framework has to rely on the fact that (1) there will be options
among which consumers will actually want to choose 69 and (2) that their set of
options will be the one advancing maximal societal utility. By narrowing
liability to cases that involve only source confusion or confusion as to the
plaintiffs responsibility for the quality of a defendant's products,70 the
consumer decision-making theory divorces the trademark system from a
discussion of global utility. This is puzzling from both descriptive and
prescriptive vantage points. This Article will argue in Part III that, as a
descriptive matter, the doctrines of initial interest confusion, post-sale
confusion, sponsorship confusion, and dilution are likely all rooted in part and
often on an implicit level in a wish to protect consumer and overall utility.
Whether they do so in actuality depends in part on one's understanding of what
the empirical measures should be in the first place, but in the model advanced in
this Article, emphasis on hedonic experiences of trademarks can potentially
provide some degree of support for all of these doctrines except probably initial
interest confusion.
C. The Contractarian Understanding
Jeremy Sheff's motivation to develop a contractarian theory of trademarks
stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the preexisting economic models.7 '
Essentially, the contractarian theory grounds trademark law in the safeguarding
of consumer autonomy and need to protect the consumer as an end in himself;
the model states, among other things, that a seller would violate this autonomy
6 81d. at 135.
69 Ralph Brown would have likely opposed the argument I am making here because to
him, it is advertising that undercuts consumers' ability to choose. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165,
1182-83 (1948) ("The choice between one highly advertised dentifrice and another is, in
important respects, no choice at all.... It is only a choice between one illusion and
another."). As I discussed in the context of Nozick's experience machine, see supra notes
10-12 and accompanying text, I disagree with this characterization. As one might expect
based on his views of advertising, Brown was a vocal critic of dilution, calling it '4[t]he
clearest, most candid, and most far-reaching claim on behalf of persuasive values." Brown,
supra, at 1191.
70 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 60, at 415.
71 See Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 2-3) [hereinafter Sheff, MMM], available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2021394.
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if she delivered a good to a consumer that was made by a different producer
than the one the consumer wished to choose. 72 Sheff argues that "[t]his view of
trademark as promise . .. offers a much more defensible descriptive consumer-
focused account of the courts' treatment of product quality in infringement
cases than does the search-costs theory of consequentialism." 73 As I will show
in this section, while his proposal seeks to avoid some of the empirical hurdles
of the search-costs theory, it is ultimately problematic on its own terms for two
key reasons. The first is that the contractarian theory of trademarks (just like the
contractarian argument for prohibiting insider trading on which the theory relies
in part) contains important internal tensions. The second is that it runs into
empirical problems of its own, which-rather than being confronted directly-
are redirected toward the democratic process with little guidance as to the
methodology through which said process is supposed to develop the correct
answers.
I will begin by taking a closer look at the contractarian model for
prohibiting insider trading to which Sheff analogizes for support.74 Like other
contractarian frameworks, the one for insider trading asks "what preferences
individuals would express if they were asked to give their opinions about a
potential set of rules, assuming that they did not know their position in life in
advance and there were no forms of coercion." 75 Some scholars have argued for
making insider trading unlawful because individuals "would not agree to be part
of a system where their disadvantage in access to knowledge could be turned
into disadvantages in the distribution of other resources." 76 Others have
countered, however, that this is not necessarily accurate in that individuals do
not all make the same risk assessments; indeed, some people would prefer to
allow particular forms of insider trading if this could help to avoid disastrous
losses such as the ones to the investors in the WorldCom breakdown.77 It has
been argued that allowing insider trading under a certain set of conditions could
facilitate the prevention of such disasters as well as improve stock valuations.78
If one accepts the empirical claims implicit in this argument-or if one at least
believes that respecting individual autonomy, as contractarianism asks us to do,
mandates allowing people to endorse these empirical claims-a strict
72 Id. at 44-45.
73 Id. at 45.
74 See id. at 3 1-32.
7 5 Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to the Rescue?: Insider Trading as a Tool to
Combat Accounting Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 973, 995 (2011) (citing Kim Lane Scheppele,
"It's Just Not Right": The Ethics ofInsider Trading, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 152
(1993)). Note that I am not focused on or drawing any conclusions about the wisdom of
insider trading regulations as a whole but am rather only interested in its contractarian
justification and only to the extent that it is used as a parallel to explain trademark law
through a contractarian lens.
76 1d. (citing Scheppele, supra note 75, at 162).
77 See id. at 996.7 8Id at 1015.
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contractarian theory of prohibiting insider trading cannot hold. 79 In my view,
this is one illustration of how contractarianism is unable to escape difficult
empirical questions given that the answers to those questions heavily influence
the types of ex ante choices that individuals would or would not want to be able
to make if placed behind John Rawls's famous veil of ignorance.80
This leads me to my second point, which is a critique of the reasoning
employed to avoid the problem that a contractarian theory of trademarks
ultimately relies on empirical assumptions just like consequentialist theories
such as the search-costs model do. Sheff heavily faults law and economics
because it "unsatisfyingly attempts to dodge fundamental normative questions
by replacing them with empirical questions that are in practical terms
impossible to answer."8t He similarly criticizes Jennifer Rothman's work on
initial interest confusion82 for "mak[ing] our rules of trademark law dependent
on fiendishly complex and generally unanswerable questions about the balance
of welfare gains and transaction costs that might be causally related to a
particular marketing practice (or worse, to a rule that permits or forbids such a
practice)." 83 Sheff explains that both the consequentialist supporters and critics
79 See id. at 996. Some of the application of this idea to the trademarks contractarian
model may hinge on which version of contractarianism one chooses, but both of the
possibilities Sheff mentions are problematic. Wagner's comments respond to what Sheff
terms "modem contractualists [who] ... would allow for some limited interference with
individuals' decisionmaking, but only to the extent that the individual would (at least
hypothetically) consent to such interference as a useful aid to that individual's rational and
informed decisionmaking." Sheff, MMM, supra note 71, at 26. The other possibility is the
traditional Kantian model, which would prohibit any activity that interferes with an
individual's choices whether the interference was beneficial or not "and even if he consented
(or would hypothetically consent) to the interference-on the theory that it is the
individual's duty to ... pursue his own ends, and he may not be used as a means to any end
(even one believed to be in his interest)." Id. It seems to me that any offering of products to a
consumer already arguably constitutes interference in his choices and that any attempt to sell
goods to an individual while ultimately hoping to profit financially is to use him as a means
to an end on some level. This may look a little different under other formulations of the
categorical imperative. For instance, under the third formulation, an individual may use
others as means as long as she simultaneously still views them as ends, which may relax the
tension a bit but still requires many steps before a theory of trademarks can be developed on
this basis, if at all. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 43
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
80 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). Or, as John Bronsteen, Chris
Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur have put it, any theory rooted in individuals' preferences
"ultimately collapses into a subjective theory of well-being. Indeed, the two may be one and
the same." Bronsteen et al., Welfare, supra note 17, at 1616-17.
81 Sheff, MMM, supra note 71, at 5. He also argues that "adopting a contractualist
approach to problems in consumer protection law encourages policymakers and critics to
formulate and defend substantive principles of consumer autonomy, rather than resting on
unprovable empirical assumptions about consumer behavior to justify a particular allocation
of rights and duties in consumer markets." Id. at 59.82 See Rothman, supra note 21.
83 Sheff, MMM, supra note 71, at 54-55.
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of broad trademark rights face "inescapable empirical uncertainty." 84 He
continues:
[T]he consequentialist's only possible answer is to demand more data-no
matter how futile or unreasonable the demand may be. A great strength of the
relativistic approach that incorporates the contractualist perspective is that it
frees us from the fool's game of arguing these empirical questions in the
absence of relevant data, without requiring us to adopt a misappropriation
theory that lacks discernable boundaries.... [T]he only question is whether the
marketing tactic in question is inconsistent with due respect for the consumer's
autonomy, and the debate on that question can be focused through the other-
regarding consequentialist exercise. 85
He views judges as capable of engaging in this exercise, at most in need of
correction by the democratic process, which can include debate over different
normative visions in a way that is "more likely to lead to satisfying policy
outcomes, in [his] view, than insisting on a normative position that can only be
satisfactorily justified by expert analysis of data that will never materialize." 86
There are a number of significant problems with these claims, including that
his conclusions fall prey to some of the same flaws to which he points in search-
costs theory. First, the argument that courts or democracy are better equipped to
decide what constitutes a violation of autonomy than what will optimize search
costs is a fairly unsupported empirical assertion that would be tremendously
difficult to falsify even if incorrect. Second, what are the methods through
which courts or the legislative process are supposed to discover whether a
violation of autonomy has taken place? And how will said methods yield non-
falsifiable answers? Sheff states that he is "invit[ing] a debate over the
substance of what we want our consumer markets to look like, rather than over
the plausibility of various alternative and ultimately unprovable causal
inferences regarding how players in those markets might respond to one or
another legal rule."87 How can a debate over substance take place without a
discussion of which legal methods will empirically yield specific results? While
I sympathize with the frustrations over the difficulties of the search-costs and
any other consequentialist models, the contractarian model does not hold a
comparative edge. It poses just as many empirical difficulties and adds another
layer of complication, which is the need to define and get the relevant
individuals to agree on the elusive concept of autonomy and what its violations
entail.88 As has been shown in the insider trading context, this project is bound
84 Id at 55.85 1d. (footnote omitted).
86 Id. at 57.87 d. at 56.
88 One may disagree with the particular criteria I use to compare the validity of the
contractarian theory with that of other models. If one rejects especially falsifiability as a
criterion to assess the validity of a theory, however, one must show what should take its
place and will lead to an objective evaluation.
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to struggle on its own terms, and the contractarian model is no more likely to
yield clear boundaries than the search-costs framework. 89
The main lesson from this examination of the contractarian model is that no
theory is likely to escape the genuine empirical difficulties that any trademark
system poses. There is no way around asking what practical effects particular
laws will have and how we can best measure these effects. Short of becoming
victim to the nirvana fallacy, all that any theory of trademarks can do is show
how it is an improvement over other models rather than engage in futile
attempts to avoid altogether the debates inherent in this area of the law.
III. EXPERIENTIAL TRADEMARKS: THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS
In this spirit, Part III will present what I view as a piece that is missing or at
least too easily discarded in discussions about the less straightforward types of
trademark infringement doctrines. One of the more cynical stories about why
trademark law has taken the particular shape we observe today is a public
choice tale, especially in the context of dilution doctrine. The Supreme Court
ruled in the Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.90 case in 2003 that actual
dilution of famous marks rather than simply a likelihood of dilution was
required under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) for a valid legal
claim to exist. 91 In response, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act of 2006 (TDRA), 92 which specified that only likelihood of dilution was
necessary under the FTDA and added some other measures to protect famous
marks. Lobbying played a key role in the passage of the TDRA, with both the
owners of famous marks and groups such as the International Trademark
Association and the American Intellectual Property Law Association pushing
for the legislation.93 While one can therefore see how, on a pragmatic level, the
maximization of global welfare is far from being the only factor that drives
trademark policy, this does not necessarily make doctrines like dilution outliers
in the world of trademark law. I will show in this Part how a consequentialist
analysis that incorporates hedonic values can help to explain the current shape
of the law and resolve some of the tensions that scholars like Mark McKenna
89 At most, a Kantian-like approach to trademarks could provide what Robert Nozick
has termed side constraints, meaning here, for example, that trademark doctrine would need
to be developed based on consequentialist principles but would not be permitted to impose
dignitary harms. See NozICK, supra note 10, at 26-33. This tells us relatively little about the
shape of trademark law as a descriptive or prescriptive matter, though. I would like to thank
Bailey Kuklin for the conversation we had on this subject. For an in-depth discussion of
Kantian approaches to legal issues, see Bailey Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy: A Kantian
Framework (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
90 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
9 1 Id. at 433.
92 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
93 See Manta, supra note 45, at 511. I have explained how this type of lobbying has also
played a role in the development of certain harsher sanctions in the trademark and copyright
world than in the patent world. See id.
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and Jeremy Sheff have critiqued in their works. Whether incorporating hedonic
values fully justifies the current scope of protection remains subject to empirical
evaluation of the size of the likely harm as compared against the costs of
dilution law itself, including enforcement and transaction costs as well as the
hedonic cost to the potential or actual customers of dilutive goods.
A. Dilution as Hedonic Loss
If most or all dilution does not actually create significant search costs for
consumers, deceive consumers as required for infringement under McKenna's
theory, or violate autonomy as understood in Sheff's contractarian model, why
prohibit it? What is the possible issue with the Gucci burger? This section will
first discuss whether dilution and other phenomena pose a problem as a matter
of free riding on another actor's Lockean-style labor contribution and conclude
that free riding per se need not reduce utility and should therefore not be
actionable. 94 Combined with a loss of hedonic utility, however, free riding
could potentially cause a net decline of overall utility.95 The case law that
equates free riding with doctrines like dilution may thus turn out to be less
mysterious if we are open to the possibility that while judges have not always
clearly articulated the precise harm to consumers, they have already implicitly
accepted the idea that not only producer but also consumer utility will be
maximized by limiting competitors' use of the original trademarks even in
situations that span separate markets and lack the element of confusion. As
mentioned, whether current doctrine optimally supports the maximization of
global societal utility is subject to further studies and analysis, but the first step
is to understand the basic role of hedonic harm in dilution.
94 For a discussion of Lockean labor theory in the context of intellectual property, see
generally Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in
Intellectual Property Theory, 29 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 283 (2012); Adam Mossoff, The Use
andAbuseoflPat the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA.L. REv. 2001 (2009).
95 This issue also deserves consideration along a temporal axis. Establishing a
relationship between a consumer and a brand takes time, and dilution has the potential to
disrupt this process at any number of stages, from the early contacts that the consumer has
with the product to a much later moment when long-term trust exists. While producers may
be able to overcome dilution in many cases, this will require diverse and sometimes
expensive forms of damage control because dilution at each stage could cause a unique set
of hedonic losses that vary in type and depth. This does not imply that dilution is unable to
carry some degree of countervailing benefits, which in most cases it does, but this helps to
explain why it is a phenomenon worthy of consideration.
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1. And I'm Free, Free Riding96
One defense of dilution and related doctrines is that they seek to prevent
junior users from free riding on the labor and investments of the senior user.
David Franklyn has argued that the desire to counteract free riding is the real
driving force behind the success of many plaintiffs in dilution-based lawsuits, as
evidenced by the fact that these plaintiffs win when unable to show actual harm
from dilution but able to demonstrate the existence of free riding.97 Indeed, one
could make a variety of moral arguments against one actor's ability to profit
from the work of another. At the same time, Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna
have explained that "[t]he claim that trademark owners are injured by not being
able to control use in a remote market is ultimately a circular claim-mark
owners are injured if, but only if, we define their trademark rights ex ante to
include control over that remote market." 98 They emphasize the circularity of
the claim that the harm to owners comes from the fact "that if someone benefits
from the use of a mark they own, that benefit belongs to them, and therefore
they have been injured by not being paid a license fee for the right to authorize
that use." 99 Lemley and McKenna's point is well-taken that the sheer fact that
an owner could obtain compensation if awarded a specific right does not, in and
of itself, mean that he has that right. Similarly, if a person looks at me funny in
the street, that does not constitute a cognizable harm even though I would
benefit (at least in the short run) from having the law force her to pay me a
thousand dollars, whether to obtain a license to look at me funny or as
subsequent compensation for having done so. From a utilitarian perspective, if
company B is able to free ride on company A's goodwill while increasing
society's welfare, we should want company B to do so.100 At the same time,
while the costs of establishing a valuable trademark are high, "the cost of
duplicating someone else's trademark is small .. . [and t]he incentive to incur
this cost (in the absence of legal regulation) will be greater the stronger the
trademark,"' 0 ' with the risk that various forms of unauthorized use "will
eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark, and the
961 hope Tom Petty will forgive me for this, but I only paraphrased him with love. See
TOM PETTY, Free Fallin', on FULL MOON FEVER (MCA Records 1989) ("And I'm free, free
fallin'.").
97 David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the
Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 118 (2004).
98 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 141.
99 1d. at 145.
100This is making several assumptions, including that we can measure these values to
some relevant degree and that we have the capacity to implement a regime fine-grained
enough that it will be able to allow Company B's actions without also permitting other
companies to free ride on Company A in a way that promotes general disutility.
101 Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 270.
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prospect of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a
valuable trademark in the first place." 102
The battle, then, is about what forms of free riding trademark law should
allow given that when an owner acquires a mark, he neither does nor should get
control over every conceivable use of a particular word. 103 Lemley and
McKenna summarize a number of studies that generally do not support the idea
that consumers' global assessments of brands are negatively affected by a
particular brand extension. 104 There have been instances, however, that have
gone the other way. In 1994, Gucci almost went bankrupt after licensing its
brand to products such as toilet paper and tote bags.' 05 Deborah Roedder John
and her colleagues have concluded on the basis of their studies that "the risk of
brand and line extensions does not stop at the parent brand level. Inconsistent
extensions carry the risk of diluting important consumer beliefs about individual
products that carry the parent brand name."106 Plus, "even if flagship products
were completely impervious to dilution, blurring still might negatively impact
the ability of the famous mark owner to launch new products and extensions
because of the effort required to distinguish authorized from unauthorized new
uses."10 7 In other words, dilution law will possibly protect the brand from
financial decline in some instances and against future direct trademark
infringement in other cases.
Lemley and McKenna, however, propose that mark owners should have to
prove harm before invoking dilution law as a shield, and they argue that "[i]f
mark owners can neither show confusion about source or responsibility for
quality nor that the alleged confusion is material, then any 'injury' the mark
owner suffers is not a trademark injury."108 The great difficulty of showing such
injury even if that injury is real, however, is precisely part of what drove
Congress to pass the TDRA. 109 Of course, accepting the TDRA's requirement
to show likelihood of dilution still leaves room for shaping doctrine in many
different ways, especially because courts have a lot of latitude in delineating
102 Id
103 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) (arguing against giving property rights in gross).104 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 158-60.
105 Bradford, supra note 56, at 1277. "Self-dilution" is generally not a concern because
brand owners generally do not wish to weaken their own brands and they try to correct their
marketing practices when it does occur, such as in Gucci's case. At the same time, Shahar
Dillbary discusses some instances in which owners have used their own brands to mislead
consumers into buying lower-quality goods and proposes changes in the application of false
advertising law to stem this practice. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for
False Advertising, 31 CARDOzO L. REv. 327 (2009).
106 Deborah Roedder John et al., The Negative Impact of Extensions: Can Flagship
Products Be Diluted?, 62 J. MARKETING 19, 31 (1998).
107 Bradford, supra note 56, at 1277.
108 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 188.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 for a discussion about the passage of the
TDRA in response to the Moseley case.
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just how high the likelihood of dilution must be to constitute an actionable
harm. What is fascinating in this context, however, is that most arguments about
dilution have roughly followed this pattern so far: Dilution (perhaps) harms
producers by diminishing their gains. Consumers are, at most, hurt indirectly, in
that dilution (perhaps) decreases producers' incentives to create and sell
products that consumers may like. Consumers themselves are not directly hurt
by dilution because, by definition, they are not actually confused by the product
that they purchase.11 0 And the arguments about doctrines like post-sale
confusion follow similar patterns. But is this really right? The next section will
discuss another possible harm for consumers: the hedonic loss of experiencing a
product with a diluted trademark.
2. Protecting Trademarks as Hedonic Devices
Laura Bradford has cautioned against awarding trademark rights on the
basis of the positive feelings that consumers may have about these marks.11'
Her concern is based in part on fearing that "[a]warding property rights for the
ability to signal general familiarity and consistency may raise ... monopoly
concerns. No competitor can ever compete effectively with a category leader on
this basis. The established brand will always be more familiar."ll 2 Yet, a
trademark system founded on the maximization of general utility cannot ignore
the individual hedonic utility that consumers derive from using products that
have specific brands, and that these brand-product combinations can only serve
as optimal hedonic devices when certain conditions are fulfilled. 113 So far,
however, the mainstream theories of trademarks have either disregarded the
existence of such hedonic utility or dismissed it as unimportant or outside the
scope of legal protection. Such a position can perhaps be made to work, at least
in part, if the only form of utility we care about is financial.1 4 That is not the
stance of the critics of hedonic values, however-rather, they may view hedonic
values as a threat precisely because of the way these can lead to an expansion of
110 See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 154 ("[M]uch of the rhetoric used
by both courts and commentators to justify dilution has focused on the idea of a trademark as
a property right that confers control over noncompeting uses whether or not consumers are
hurt."). Meanwhile, Eric Goldman describes that at an academic symposium on the subject
of dilution in 2007, two dozen trademark academics sought to "find some justification-
ANY justification-for the trademark dilution doctrine. We struck out, of course." Goldman,
supra note 25.
111 See Bradford, supra note 56, at 1283.
112 Id
113 Again, brands' optimality as hedonic devices must be measured in the context of
global utility, which includes taking into account the hedonic benefit that junior users
provide and the costs of law enforcement as well as transaction costs, plus any other costs
and benefits to society as a whole. I thank Eric Goldman for his comments on this topic.
ll4For a critique of traditional cost-benefit analysis that only centers on financial
values, see generally Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis, supra note 17.
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trademark protection in some areas and thus interfere with other non-monetary
values such as expression."15
While we speak about the five senses in common parlance and sometimes
separate out "perception" from "cognition," all sensory and conscious as well as
subconscious experiences are processed in one central organ, the brain.1 6 There
is no "actual" or "pure" experience of a glass of soda.11 7 Even leaving aside
phenomena such as (open or subliminal) advertising, our experiences of
products with sensory components are colored by a variety of memories and
genetic backgrounds. Using soda as an example, "[fjor modem humans,
behavioral preferences for food and beverages are potentially modulated by an
enormous number of sensory variables, hedonic states, expectations, semantic
priming, and social context." 18 When it comes to the epic contest between
Coke and Pepsi, an individual's knowledge of what brand of soda he or she was
tasting made all the difference in one study: it accounted for both a change in
expressed behavioral preferences and a measuiable contrast in cerebral
responses as measured via functional Magnetic Resonance Imagining (fMRI)
even though the soda sample used consisted of Coke across every condition."19
Indeed, subjects displayed a significant preference for the soda that had the
Coke label over both unlabeled Coke soda and over Coke soda labeled Pepsi.120
This result could arise from multiple factors, including the marketing power of
15 For a discussion of some scholars' rejection of the so-called "atmospherics"
surrounding trademarks, see infra note 163 and accompanying text.
116 Chris Buccafusco has argued that the boundaries and differences between copyright
and patent law can be explained through the traditional distinctions that have been drawn
between the human senses. See Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual
Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2012).
117 In their work on hedonic analysis of the law, John Bronsteen and his coauthors have
stated that well-being "depends solely on how a person feels rather than on any other (for
example, more objective) consideration or fact ... [and] can be influenced only by those
things that affect a person's sensory, emotional, or cognitive experience of life." Bronsteen
et al., Welfare, supra note 17, at 1601. They add: "Anything that is outside this veil of
experience and has no effect on it is irrelevant to the quality of a person's life." Id. at 1601-
02. That being said, some claims about a product are objective (e.g., stating that a soda has
zero calories), and a manufacturer that lies in those regards can run afoul of false advertising
laws.
118 Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for
Culturally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 379, 379 (2004).
1 9 1d at 385. This result replicates the findings of earlier studies that had less
sophisticated methodologies. See, e.g., Mary E. Woolfolk et al., Pepsi Versus Coke: Labels,
Not Tastes, Prevail, 52 PSYCHOL. REP. 185, 185 (1983) (suggesting that labels more heavily
influence consumer preference for specific sodas than the products themselves do). For a
general discussion of the use of fMRI and other techniques to understand consumer
preferences, see ZALTMAN, supra note 2, at 111-28.
120 McClure et al., supra note 118, at 385.
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Coke thanks to advertising and so onl 21 but also the personal memories that a
label may trigger in a way that the taste itself does not. 122
This is one example in which talking about the "quality" of a good becomes
very difficult.123 What does it mean to ensure through trademark law that the
Coke brand can maintain its quality-indicating function?l 24 When people buy
Coke, they have a whole host of expectations as to how the soda will taste, how
carbonated it will be, and so on. But as we can see from the research, how it
tastes, for instance, is affected by the existence of the label itself. The same is
true for status goods: the qualities that people expect from a Gucci bag do not
just relate to how durable the leather of a purse will be but are rather also
intertwined with the meaning of the label itself. And if that's the case, the
question becomes who should be able to control the meaning of that label and in
what ways. 125
The path toward answering that question again leads back to an
examination of societal utility. What will increase the incentives for product
creation and for maximal hedonic appreciation of goods, among other
values?' 26 The answer to the former is debatable in that an argument can be
121 As Deven Desai has put it, "A sip of Coke means imbibing an entire culture." Desai,
supra note 23, at 983.122 Mark Lemley mentions the relationship between childhood memories and soda
preferences. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1692-93 (1999).123 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 157-62.
124 For a discussion of the traditional understanding of this function in trademark law,
see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
125 The attempt to narrowly define what should constitute a relevant quality to a given
consumer smacks of some degree of what Dan Kahan and other scholars have termed
"cognitive illiberalism," a phenomenon whereby individuals "simultaneously experience
overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions we hold in common
with our confederates and unwarranted contempt for the perceptions associated with our
opposites." Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 843 (2009). For a discussion of
the dangers of cognitive illiberalism in the copyright context, see Manta, supra note 16, at
1307.
126 This Article does not seek to diminish the complexities of this question. For example,
individuals' tastes and hence hedonic losses can vary for any number of reasons. See, e.g.,
Meghan R. Busse et al., Projection Bias in the Car and Housing Markets (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18212, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2101959 (describing individuals' tendency to assume that future
tastes will resemble present ones). Another complication is that not all hedonic losses create
equally lasting effects. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
S157, S164 (2008). Last, some research suggests that people generally experience larger
hedonic gains from spending money on nonmaterial experiences rather than goods, which
they may do in increased amounts in a world with weaker brands. See Travis J. Carter &
Thomas Gilovich, The Relative Relativity of Material and Experiential Purchases, 98 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 146 (2010) (concluding that experiential purchases are
simpler to perform and lead to greater well-being). There is a limit, however, to the sheer
amount of time that individuals can spend on nonmaterial experiences, so while individual
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made that Gucci burgers would not have started selling if the owner did not
think he would be able to free ride off of the Gucci name. An important
question, subject to further empirical investigation, is whether consumers get a
particularly significant hedonic "kick" out of eating Gucci-labeled food-one
large enough to trump the hedonic loss resulting to the owners of Gucci purses.
This may distinguish situations of dilution, occurring in unrelated markets, from
those of direct confusion in related ones. A customer is likely to get a high level
of enjoyment out of wearing a fake Gucci bag that she believes to be real (an
enjoyment that may be cut short if the bag falls apart or if someone with more
expertise points out the fake nature of the good). Direct confusion may not fall
squarely into the hedonic model and may remain better explained by traditional
theories such as the search-costs model if it turns out that, at times, the global
hedonic gains from counterfeits outweigh the losses to the originalS.127 In the
dilution paradigm, the Gucci burger may not provide the Coke-label enjoyment
induced in Samuel McClure's fMRI study.128 At the same time, as mentioned, it
could reduce the enjoyment that the wearer of an original Gucci bag
experiences, for instance by detracting from the exclusive nature of the
brand.129 This effect would likely multiply with every additional diluting good,
discrete experiences of this sort may carry a hedonic edge in studies, there is likely to be a
fairly low limit on the number of such experiences that individuals will be able to and will
want to have within a given amount of time. Some material goods will also transcend this
barrier more than others to the extent that their users focus on their experience rather than
just purchase of them. Nonmaterial experiences further have the real potential to provide
unhappiness if they prove disappointing, sometimes more so than material goods. See
Leonardo Nicolao et al., Happiness for Sale: Do Experiential Purchases Make Consumers
Happier than Material Purchases?, 36 J. CONSUMER REs. 188, 197 (2009). A more detailed
exploration of these issues will also need to account for the role that hedonic adaptation
plays in people's experiences of brands. See generally Shane Frederick & George
Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 2003) (presenting research showing how
individuals generally revert to their previous levels of happiness over time after even major
positive or negative life events). John Bronsteen, Chris Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur
have described in their work about the effect of hedonic adaptation on settlements that it is in
the early stages of adaptation that "hedonic reactions are most intense." John Bronsteen et
al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1516,
1534 (2008). Conversely, applying this idea to brands may mean that consumers experience
the greatest hedonic gain right after they purchase a new product and that they only
experience reduced benefits later. This is likely to vary greatly by type of product, but to the
extent that social scientists attempt to better measure the effect of brands on hedonic
experiences, longitudinal studies may prove important in gaining a clearer picture.
127 While we normally think of direct confusion as the greatest threat within the
trademark infringement system, empirical research may show that the loss in hedonic utility
is often larger with dilution, and a system solely based on immediate hedonic values could
perplexingly even allow direct confusion while prohibiting dilution. I would like to thank
Jonathan Masur for the conversation we had on this subject.128 See McClure et al., supra note 118.12 9 And unlike where a brand accidentally weakens its own brand, as in Gucci's decision
to put the mark on tote bags and toilet paper, see supra note 105 and accompanying text,
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and it is not evident (although not impossible) that this would be offset by the
hedonic gains from the diluting goods.
There are a variety of ways in which this hypothesis could be tested, and I
will sketch out some basic ideas along those lines here. Researchers could begin
by measuring the physical responses to or ask for the opinions of subjects about
a number of branded purses. Then, one could expose subjects to an environment
that contains a product (or several) such as the Gucci burger and perform a
renewed measure of subjects' responses to the original goods.130 Of course, if
this was a survey done for actual litigation purposes, a measured reduction in
hedonic enjoyment would not be sufficient for a plaintiff to win. Rather, this
would simply constitute evidence toward meeting the "likelihood of dilution"
standard. To the extent scholars have asked to see actual harm from dilution,
one harm could be that the benefit we get from places that sell Gucci burgers
generally do not compensate for the cost, even in situations where incentives to
produce are not immediately affected. Indeed, maybe Gucci burgers are enough
of a blip to leave Gucci's revenues themselves unaffected.
For an approximate measure of the hedonic benefit of such Gucci burgers,
one could serve study subjects burgers named either "Gucci burger" or given a
name that connotes luxuriousness without using an existing famous trademark.
For example, one of the world's most expensive burgers is called "Le Burger
Extravagant" (and retails at $295).131 One could then measure whether the
Gucci burger provides a higher hedonic benefit than the one with the control
name, and by how much. This data could be compared to the data on the
hedonic losses incurred by the owner of original Gucci goods who encounters
the Gucci burgers of the junior user of the mark as delineated in the study
above.132 Over time, these experiments are likely to become more refined and
hence the results more reliable. Some things will certainly remain difficult to
measure, such as the level of second-order innovation that would follow from
allowing versus disallowing particular dilutive uses. 133
In the context of measuring various value trade-offs, one could argue that a
small, local mom-and-pop establishment selling Gucci burgers is unlikely to
become a destination for many users of original Gucci goods. Given the
national and sometimes global nature of most businesses today, this story is
beginning to erode, however. The mom-and-pop shop can set up a website
(www.gucciburgers.com), if nothing else, which rich and poor people alike can
there is no corrective mechanism in the dilution context because the junior user's incentives
are not aligned with those of the consumers of the original goods.
130For a broader discussion of methods to measure hedonic values, see generally
Bronsteen et al., Welfare, supra note 17, at 1595-1600.
131 Tom, Top 10 Most Expensive Burgers, MOST EXPENSIVE JOURNAL (Aug. 5, 2012),
http://most-expensive.net/burgers-world.
132I appreciated my conversation with Rebecca Tushnet on this subject.
1331 would like to thank Eric Goldman for his comments on this point.
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encounter in cyberspace.134 Also, while Gucci customers may never eat a Gucci
burger, other individuals may, and their opinion of Gucci and of those who use
the company's products could change for the negative.135 This brings us to the
topic of post-sale confusion as well as other doctrines and how hedonic loss
relates to them.
B. Expanding Hedonic Valuation to Other Trademark Doctrines
Post-sale confusion is a doctrine that applies to situations in which the
buyers of a counterfeit good are not confused themselves, but the public at large
is confused when encountering those goods down the line.136 In the context of a
case involving fake Rolex watches, where the defendant claimed that the
purchasers knew that the watches were not real, the court explained:
Individuals examining the counterfeits, believing them to be genuine Rolex
watches, might find themselves unimpressed with the quality of the item and
consequently be inhibited from purchasing the real time piece. Others who see
the watches bearing the Rolex trademarks on so many wrists might find
themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine because the items have
become too commonplace and no longer possess the prestige once associated
with them. The fact that such bogus watches can be obtained at cheap prices
only aggravates the problem. 137
134 It is noteworthy that the existing Gucci burger is only sold in one local establishment,
"The Bag and Kettle," and does not form a part of the establishment's website name. See
supra note 25. This could help to explain why it has never led to legal action by the original
Gucci company in that the company either does not know about it or does not view it as
sufficiently problematic to pursue any claims. I confirmed via phone conversation with "The
Bag and Kettle" co-owner Jay Reynolds on February 26, 2013 that the original Gucci
company never gave him any trouble and that the establishment chose the name to connote a
high-end burger.
135 Paul Heald and Robert Brauneis performed a study on the likely harms of dilution
and compared the period before the FTDA was passed (i.e., 1995) with that after to conclude
that it is unlikely that dilution was causing significant problems even before the legislation.
See Heald & Brauneis, supra note 34, at 2575. Their study, however, focused on economic
harm alone rather than hedonic values, plus the FTDA was passed when the Internet was still
in its fairly early stages and did not play nearly as dominant a role as it does today in
advertising and promoting dilutive uses of marks.
13 6 See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (involving post-
sale confusion via replicas of luxury cars).
137 Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1349 (1lth Cir. 1987) (holding that post-sale
confusion in the context of luxury watches was sufficient for a cognizable claim under the
Lanham Act); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960, 964 (1993)
("They're buying the fakes precisely because they're fake; these folks want to pretend to
own a Rolex without paying the price-which also means Rolex is not losing any sales
because the people buying twenty dollar fakes wouldn't have bought the real thing."). That
people who buy fakes would never buy the original product is possible yet not certain, and
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An older case dealing with imitation luxury Swiss clocks similarly
identified the harm in such cases as a producer loss of either consumers,
reputation, or both.138 The possible reduction of hedonic enjoyment by current
and potential purchasers of the original goods is a component and precursor of
both of these types of losses.139 In that sense, a loss of hedonic enjoyment may
be able to serve as a proxy for these other kinds of harms. While quantifying
any of these harms is no easy feat, hedonic losses may be measurable or at least
approximated through experimental methods that are more immediate and better
at establishing causality than methods tracking losses of revenue and
reputation;140 indeed, these latter types of losses may not become apparent for
months or years (and perhaps sometimes in ways that will become very difficult
to remedy once the losses have actually occurred).
Another form of actionable confusion, namely that related to sponsorship or
affiliation, similarly possibly protects not only the producers' revenues but also
consumers' experiences of goods. The Lanham Act specifically condemns acts
that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person."141 Lemley and McKenna have
criticized sponsorship and affiliation confusion, arguing that the law should
instead concern itself only with confusion "about who is responsible for the
quality of the defendant's goods or services." 42 From the perspective of
the real question is what this does not only to Rolex's sales but also to the enjoyment of
those individuals who are willing to pay the price for the original product.
138 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Lecoultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).
139 Courts are reluctant to let consumers of the fake goods "acquire the prestige value of
the senior user's product by buying the copier's cheap imitation." 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:7, at 23-37 (4th ed. 2008).
Allowing these consumers to do this would cheapen the experience of the users of the
original good, both possibly literally (i.e., the producer would make less money if consumers
bought fewer original goods) and, more relevantly here, in an immediate hedonic sense.
Indeed, dilution "protects consumers' ex ante expectations from the time of purchase against
the diminution of their intangible property from the hazard of a possible externality."
Dilbary, supra note 64, at 635.
140 See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying.
141 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
142 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 60, at 427. They add that these other types of
confusion should at most be actionable through a mechanism similar to a false advertising
claim. Id. In a survey of interest in this context, a great number of individuals proved
incorrect about what companies were sponsors of the 2012 Olympics and in fact sometimes
named those companies' exact competitors, which could raise the question of how well
consumers understand sponsorship affiliations in the first place. See Laurel Wentz,
Consumers Don't Really Know Who Sponsors the Olympics, ADAGE GLOBAL (July 27,
2012), http://adage.com/article/global-news/consumers-sponsors-olympics/236367/. While
certainly not every sponsorship relationship proves a wise marketing decision, the survey
took place about a week before the Olympics had actually begun and consumers may have
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hedonic loss, however, a perceived affiliation between two entities has the
power to change the experience of a branded product. McKenna has pointed out
that consumers do not necessarily blame a host brand even when its partners
make mistakes. 143 While that could be true in some instances, the finding may
no longer hold if consumers are exposed to negative information of this sort
more than once. Further, even if they do not have a significantly decreased
reported opinion of the brand as a whole, their experience of the brand may well
change based on the false perceived relationship between two entities.
At this time, we do not have clear empirical data one way or another. On
the one hand, this militates toward disallowing a legal claim (after all, no harm
has been conclusively established). There are a number of arguments in the
other direction, though. First, there are many legal situations where we allow a
claim to proceed even if no harm has been shown in a completely bulletproof
way or at all. Rather, the level of harm often goes toward the question of
remedies. In criminal law and in torts, the risk of harm can be sufficient to lead
the state or a plaintiff to victory.144 As to the question of whether the risk is
sufficiently high in the trademark context, one cannot answer without
examining the countervailing benefits, such as that some products will become
cheaper, some consumers of diluting goods will experience hedonic gains that
they would not otherwise have had, and a number of companies will be able to
attract consumers to their products without fear of litigation.145 At the same
time, producers may no longer be able to enter some of the additional markets
that they could have, and consumers of an original good may experience
hedonic loss because of the wider dissemination of a symbol. As to the former,
producers may be discouraged from the targeted expansions of the original
brand that they could have pursued because they now have to deal with a
been less informed at that time than later on. See id Perhaps some companies are also
worried about pushing their affiliation with the Olympics too hard, lest they experience what
occurred in the past when consumers "rejected Coke's omnipresence at the Atlanta
Olympics, calling it the 'Red Rash."' WIPPERFURTH, supra note 19, at 5.
143 Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L.
REv. 63, 114-15 (2009).144
"[I]nchoate crimes can be prosecuted as crimes, just as inchoate torts are
compensable as torts." Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 557, 576 (2008). For a philosophical approach to the question of what
constitutes harm, see Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 963 (2003).
145 I would like to thank Lisa Ramsey for our conversation about this last benefit. Even
(or especially?) outright counterfeiting has a number of benefits, particularly when the
consumer of a counterfeit is using that good as a means to fit in socially rather than as a
means of self-expression. See generally Keith Wilcox et al., Why Do Consumers Buy
Counterfeit Luxury Brands?, 46 J. MARKETING RES. 247 (2009). On the flipside, some
researchers have suggested that "[o]ne way to dissuade counterfeiting would be to emphasise
personal image. For consumers who value the opinion of their peers, it will be embarrassing
if they are found to be using fake designer goods." Ian Phau et al., Targeting Buyers of
Counterfeits of Luxury Brands: A Study on Attitudes of Singaporean Consumers, 17 J.
TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MARKETING 3, 11 (2009) (footnote omitted).
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change in how much increased blurring of their brand any additional
commercial use of it can bring. In other words, because of Gucci burgers, the
original Gucci runs a higher risk of blurring with every additional product that it
wants to bring to market. And if there is such a risk to be borne, it is not clear
why it should be shouldered by the original owner rather than by the free rider.
As discussed, this is not to say that free riding is necessarily a problem or
unethical in itself. But when it comes to sponsorship or affiliation, brand owners
carefully monitor their relationships with other companies and the effect that
these relationships have on brand image.146 At the end of the day, this forces us
to ask the larger question of who should have control over commercial uses of a
trademark when there is a risk of harm and that risk is realistic yet not
conclusively proven.147
Compared to copyright, where there is a long-standing debate about
individual ownership versus accessibility through the public domain,148 the
public benefit of loosening doctrines like sponsorship confusion is unlikely to
be as significant. Advocates of weakened trademark regimes face a few
tensions, of which I will mention one: they can only claim with some difficulty
that developing a new mark is not all that hard while insisting that competitors
and the public must have commercial access to the mark in the name of
meaningful competition or free speech.149 In addition, some research has
146 This calculation contains its own commercial hazards as it is, like one can see in
Gucci's own expansion debacle in the mid-90s that I discuss in the text accompanying note
105.
147 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859, 898 (2004)
(arguing that in the case of dilution, "the actionable wrong is the loss of control over the link
between the famous mark and a single source, not the consequential harms that may follow
it"). One of the less often considered limits of that control is that companies can sometimes
use legal but possibly unsavory means to decrease society's opinion of competitors' brands,
such as when fashion designers allegedly gave reality television star Snooki purses made by
their competitors because association with her would arguably shed a negative light on those
products. See Simon Doonan, How Snooki Got Her Gucci: The Dirt on Purses, N.Y.
OBSERVER (Aug. 17, 2010, 9:55 PM), http://observer.com/2010/08/how-snooki-got-her-
gucci-the-dirt-on-purses/. See generally Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands,
Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1425 (2010) (analyzing the relationship
between branding and business competition).
148 See generally Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483 (1996). For a recent empirical study on the subject of copyright and innovation in the
music world, see Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012
Wis. L. REV. 891.
149 This is not to say that this resolves all possible conflicts between owners' interests
and the right to free speech. When it comes to analyzing the drafting and application of
trademark law, as Lisa Ramsey has explained, "[fjor speech restrictions to be constitutional,
the government interest must generally be 'substantial' for commercial speech and
'compelling' for noncommercial speech." Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment
Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 422 (2008). Empirical data on the hedonic
2013] 271
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
yielded disconcerting results as to how the conscious use of counterfeit goods
renders its users less ethical, and we do not know how these results may apply
in the context of goods that dilute or exhibit some of the other actionable
characteristics discussed here. 150
Last in this section, I would like to say a few words about initial interest
confusion in the context of hedonic loss. Initial interest confusion, as the name
suggests, refers to situations in which consumers are confused at first, but this
confusion evaporates before any actual purchase takes place.151 This doctrine
has fallen under increased criticism1 52 as it has been progressively applied to the
Internet context. 153 The case against initial interest confusion based on the
hedonic value of trademarks is probably trickier than that for the other doctrines
discussed in this Article. The argument would have to go that consumers get
less enjoyment out of goods because they wasted some time and energy buying
those goods (or other goods by the same original producer). While plaintiffs
could try to establish that this is the case, it is unlikely to succeed.154 That kind
value of marks may affect but will not by itself provide answers as to whether particular
statutes or doctrines are constitutional.
150 For instance, one study found that wearing counterfeit sunglasses led individuals to
feel less authentic and increased the occurrence of unethical behavior on their part as well as
their likelihood to view others as unethical. Francesca Gino et al., The Counterfeit Self The
Deceptive Costs ofFaking It, 21 PSYCHOL. Sci. 712, 714 (2010).
151 This concept was first discussed, without that exact label, in Grotrian, Helfferich,
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975). It also
arose when Mobil Oil sued Pegasus Petroleum because the former feared confusion based on
shared use of flying horse symbols. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petrol. Corp., 818 F.2d 254,
255-56 (2d Cir. 1987). Meanwhile, in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, the court
discussed the harm of initial interest confusion consisting of the defendant leading customers
to pay a cover charge before entering an establishment, which meant that the defendant
financially benefitted even if any confusion cleared up by the time customers actually
entered the bar in question. 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
152 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54
EMORY L.J. 507, 565-70 (2005) (criticizing the doctrine, in part for "commit[ting] the
cardinal sin of enabling a finding of trademark infringement when the junior user is making
associative or referential uses of a trademark"); Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken:
Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 97 (2004) (proposing a change of focus for the doctrine away from
protecting the original owner's goodwill and toward a model based on search costs);
Rothman, supra note 21, at 121-59 (providing several critiques of initial interest confusion,
including that it violates the Lanham Act and the First Amendment, among other issues).
153 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1031
(9th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment based on free riding on the plaintiffs mark
through the sale of banner ads keyed to the trademarked words "playboy" and "playmate");
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir.
1999) (basing the finding of infringement on the defendant's free riding on the plaintiffs
mark through the use of metatags-i.e., words embedded in a website's HTML code to
direct search results).
154 While my conclusions differ for some of the examples they give in the context of
other doctrines, when it comes to initial interest confusion, I agree with Lemley and
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of loss is conceivable mainly for products where the amount of uses of this sort
is overwhelming such that shopping for, say, an original Gucci purse becomes
an ordeal to a large enough degree that the potential consumer would rather give
up altogether or at least do it more rarely than she normally would. Like
McKenna and Lemley, I do not see initial interest confusion as a fundamentally
incorrect doctrine, but construing a genuine harm is indeed tenuous in many
instances. 155 The shopping experience itself, as divorced from any particular
trademark, could become less enjoyable, 156 but that type of harm appears too
remote to become cognizable under trademark law. Initial interest confusion is
thus probably best captured through a judicial focus on deceit rather than
hedonic loss, especially because consumers can also enjoy real gains from non-
deceptive comparison shopping.
C. Criticisms of the Hedonic Model of Trademarks
Considering the hedonic value of marks as part of a trademark infringement
regime is controversial, and critics are likely to raise a number of objections.
The first is the problem of measuring hedonic loss. I delineated some
preliminary thoughts on this topic, 157 but social scientists would certainly need
to become involved in developing the specific methods we should employ. As I
have mentioned throughout this Article, the empirical hurdles in trademark law
are real, and they arise in virtually any way that we decide to shape the system
(short of scrapping the entire enterprise). At the same time, this Article
recognizes the realities of the marketplace: that we live in a time in which
trademarks are so valuable that we now encounter them in virtual worlds like
Second Life58 and that people are willing to pay money for Diesel-branded
game elements in The Sims 3.159 These are powerful examples of how
individuals spend money on the sheer experience of a mark without expecting
any particular objective quality (for instance, I promise you that the Diesel jeans
in the Sims game will be no more durable than the generic ones). The
difficulties of the empirical project at hand should not make us shy away from
McKenna that it is difficult to show that consumers were injured "by Google selling ad
space opposite search results [or] by web sites momentarily diverting surfers' attention with
a URL." Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 156.
155 1d. Unlike Jennifer Rothman, I do not necessarily see a conflict with the statutory
text of the Lanham Act. See Rothman, supra note 21, at 122-24. That being said, her point is
well-taken that courts have at times used perhaps overly liberal interpretations of the word
"confusion" when actually applying the doctrine. Id.
156 For example, some potential consumers may prefer to have an easier time looking up
a brand online whereas others like to see a variety of links show up in their searches.
157 See supra Part III.A.2.
158 For a discussion of trademark issues in Second Life and related worlds, see, for
example, Theodore C. Max, Trademarks in the Veldt: Do Virtual Lawyers Dream ofElectric
Trademarks?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 282 (2011).
159 The Sims 3 Diesel Stuff Pack, ELECTRONIC ARTS, http://www.ea.com/the-sims-3-
diesel-stuff (last visited July 4, 2012).
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it. As I have hopefully shown so far, a system that only views marks as reducers
of search costs or as indicators of a small subset of qualities is one that is letting
(empirical) perfection be the enemy of the good.
Furthermore, the measurement problem is not unique to trademark law. We
validate all sorts of difficult-to-measure legally cognizable harms, such as
emotional distress' 60 or losses of personal or professional reputation.161 If
anything, uncertainties about the level of harm in such cases affect the level of
damages rather than leading to calls of abolishing the doctrines altogether.
When it comes to trademarks, hedonic loss would normally not even affect the
level of damages because (1) for many of the cases that fall under the doctrines
discussed, the plaintiffs can generally only seek injunctions1 62 and (2) the
plaintiffs are the mark owners rather than the consumers who suffer the hedonic
loss, so the plaintiffs would probably not directly be able to seek higher
damages on this basis.
Another argument against recognizing hedonic losses is the potential
negative effect on market competition. Jessica Litman has argued that just
because what she terms the "atmospherics" of a mark have value, this does not
mean that said value should be protected, and she asks:
If the customers want to move on, to get in bed with other products that have
similar atmospherics, why shouldn't they? ...
... If the thing itself is valuable, if it is in some sense itself a product, then
we want other purveyors to compete in offering it to consumers in their own
forms and on their own terms. 163
While we have no clear empirical evidence showing that acts like dilution
diminish producers' overall income, we also have no such evidence in the other
160 For a discussion of the measurement of experiences such as emotional distress in the
present and as technology advances, see Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011).
161 For some examples such as defamation and others, see Douglas Laycock, The Death
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv. 687, 744 n.30 9 (1990).
162 The Lanham Act specifies that the remedy for dilution is an injunction unless willful
dilution can be proven. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (2006). Further, most of the newer state anti-
dilution statutes both only provide damages in cases of actual rather than likely dilution and
only do so for willful dilution, so "damages are unlikely to be awarded under state dilution
law in cases where federal law would not allow them." David S. Welkowitz, State of the
State: Is There a Future for State Dilution Laws?, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 681, 705 (2008).
163 Litman, supra note 23, at 1730-31; see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution:
The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV.
789, 858 (1997) ("Where product differentiation results from differences in the products'
tangible characteristics or quality, informed consumers rationally pay the premium. But
where product differentiation is built primarily on a nonrational or emotional basis, through
the efforts of the ad-man, consumer willingness to pay the premium proves economically
inefficient." (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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direction.164 We are further faced with a situation in which we already have
anti-dilution laws, and it is difficult to conclusively establish the hypothetical
effect of dilutive uses in their absence. And while some producers (and their
consumers) are able to gain from the sale of dilutive branded goods, we do not
know what entrepreneurial ventures these producers would have chosen to
pursue if dilution was not an option.165 As long as we do not lock up the
trademark registration system by allowing one owner to monopolize generic or
descriptive terms, 166 someone interested in commercially using the Gucci mark
has numerous alternative options for trademarks and designs under most
circumstances.
In the realm of copyright, some free riding in the form of copying is
unavoidable in areas such as musical expression.167 In trademarks, while free
riding per se is also not necessarily problematic (hence my skepticism about
rooting initial interest confusion doctrine in hedonic loss), the question is at
which point that free riding both capitalizes on the value specifically added by
the original mark owner and causes hedonic and other losses. When it comes to
copyrighted works, the consumers of original goods will generally not suffer
hedonic losses because of a new creator's works,' 68 so our focus in that area is
properly on the direct financial loss to the original owner and related incentives
only. The same could be said for the patent system.
A third objection is that hedonic appreciation of trademarks is not
something that we want to encourage. One variant of this criticism is that to the
extent consumers enjoy status goods such as Gucci purses, we should not
incentivize their behavior and we should appreciate the equalizing pressure
164 There is no doubt that the traditional circularity problem of all trademark law
remains present here-i.e., the question is what boundaries we believe to be correct as to
owners' rights in the first place, which then correlate with specific income levels.
165 That being said, one must acknowledge that we also cannot say with certainty that
the owners of the original marks would not have been more innovative in the absence of
dilution law-it is at the very least a theoretical possibility.
166 The exceptiori would be descriptive terms that have acquired secondary meaning, but
the Supreme Court has also explicitly stated in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117-21 (2004), that use of those descriptive marks is
subject to fair use. Problems certainly remain in this context, such as when entities falsely
claim to have rights in descriptive and generic terms, including through the mechanism of
cease and desist letters that can chill competition and speech. I have addressed some related
issues in Irmna D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853 (2012).
167 Olufinmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 341 (2006).
168 This is somewhat based on my intuition and deserves further study. For a discussion
of some of these issues, see Rebecca Tushnet, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright: Batman
Versus the Utility Monster, REBECCA TUSIHNET'S 43(B)LOG (Aug. 16, 2005, 5:43 PM),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2005/08/indefinitely-renewable-copyright.html.
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valve that phenomena like dilution provide.169 Another variant is that even if
the goods in question are not status goods, we should not want to incentivize
advertising expenses and a consumer focus on cognitively manufactured rather
than inherent product qualities. I mainly have two responses. First, a move away
from protecting status goods would require a reconceptualization of the entire
trademark system, at least unless one is basically willing to draw a fairly
artificial line as to the proper level of protection of status goods. It appears that
the market economy in the United States and other capitalist countries uses
status goods as carrots to inspire hard work on the part of the individuals who
want to obtain these goods one day.170 If one believes that status goods have a
detrimental effect on human psychology or the economy,"7 ' then a more
fundamental discussion of values will have to take place in the policymaking
arena, and American society will have to undergo substantial changes. It is not a
question for trademark scholarship to decide in a vacuum.
My other response to the third objection is that, as I have explained
previously, the dichotomy between real and manufactured qualities is an
artificial one. All that matters is what our brains perceive. While that can mean
that in some situations, a consumer of a counterfeit good can experience very
similar or perhaps identical enjoyment of the good if he does not know it is a
counterfeitl 72-which would seem to militate in favor of even counterfeits from
a hedonic perspective-other consumers' experiences are potentially hurt by not
only counterfeits but also dilutive uses. Not only that, but should the consumer
of the counterfeit good find out the truth, he could be sorely disappointed and
experience net hedonic loss. While doctrines based on deception alone can
mostly cover this latter problem, they cannot handle the loss to the third parties
who are the buyers of the original, undiluted goods. As this Article has shown,
shared use of a trademark may take on a rivalrous nature such as to diminish the
169 See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 35, at 772-73 (criticizing post-sale confusion as a use of
government power to enforce particular hierarchies in the social rather than commercial
context).
17 0 See generally ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING
WAY FOR MODERNITY, 1920-1940 (1985) (exploring how advertisers have incentivized a
prevailing consumption ethic). Meanwhile, in communist countries, anything perceived as a
status good tends to become the object of a lively black market. See, e.g., Nick Miroff,
Cuba's Craigslist, GLOBALPOST (May 30, 2010), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/cuba/
090723/cubas-craigslist ("On this Communist-run island, the black market is a vast,
irrepressible force, an underground river of unlicensed services, goods pilfered from
government stores and coveted items carried in from abroad. Cuban authorities go to great
lengths to curtail it; they cannot.").
171 For a skeptical take on the relationship between technological progress as
encouraged by the patent system and human happiness, see Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic
Intellectual Property: Patents and Related Rights as Engines of Happiness, Peace, and
Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 495 (2012).
172 Think of this consumer as being (temporarily) stuck inside the experience machine.
See discussion supra Part I.
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enjoyment of original goods without an equivalent resulting benefit, though, as I
have stated, this remains subject to further empirical study.
The fourth problem that I would like to address here is the objections rooted
in First Amendment concerns to dilution and related doctrines. While this
subject deserves broader treatment and a fuller normative analysis once more
empirical data on hedonic loss becomes available,173 I will offer a few purely
descriptive thoughts for now on why courts-properly cognizant of these issues
especially in artistic contexts-are unlikely to recognize any absolute bar
against dilution-style doctrines based on these types of constitutional
objections.174 As a matter of background, the Supreme Court has long held that
the regulation of deceptive or misleading speech is constitutional. 175 In San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,176 the
Court explicitly rejected the petitioner's First Amendment challenge to the
respondent's attempt to prohibit uses of the word Olympic and various related
symbols. As part of the case, the petitioner unsuccessfully argued that it should
be able to use and sell merchandise under the title "Gay Olympic Games" based
on the political content of the speech that it wanted to express.177 The Court
explained that "Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses
of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing. It also could
determine that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm
the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the
marks."1 78 Additionally, the Lanham Act already explicitly excludes fair use
and noncommercial uses from becoming the object of dilution causes of
action. 179 Thus, even though over the years, various circuit courts have become
173 For more extensive discussions of the relationship between trademark law and the
First Amendment, see generally Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L.
REV. 158 (1982); Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651 (2009); Ramsey, supra note 149;
Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095
(2003); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L.
REv. 737 (2007).
74 In other words, rather than provide a prescriptive theory of the validity of dilution
and related doctrines under the First Amendment, my goal is to briefly delineate why I
suspect that these doctrines will withstand constitutional scrutiny to provide context for my
analysis of the effect of incorporating hedonic calculations into trademark law holding other
doctrines equal.
175 See, e.g., Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
176483 U.S. 522, 523 (1987).
177 Id. at 535-40.
178 Id. at 539 (emphasis added). For a highly critical look at the trademark enforcement
surrounding the 2012 London Olympics, see Nick Cohen, Censorship Olympics,
SPECTATOR, July 14, 2012, at 14, available at http://www.spectator.co.uk/issues/14-july-
2012/censorship-olympics-/.
179 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). One may argue that these exceptions have been
applied too narrowly, but even enlarging these defenses need not conflict with a hedonic
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more liberal in upholding First Amendment challenges in artistic contexts 80
and though some forms of parody have been victorious,' 81 there is currently
little indication of any fundamental constitutional danger to the general
principles behind current dilution and related doctrines.182
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Alvarezl83 and its
discussion of the relationship between trademark law (meaning especially
dilution) and the First Amendment likely provides no exception, as a brief
sketch will indicate.184 In Alvarez, the Court affirmed that the Stolen Valor Act,
which sought to prohibit individuals from falsely claiming that they had
obtained particular military medals, should be struck down. 85 Both Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion 86 and Justice Alito's dissent 87 make references to
trademark law and dilution.' 8 8 Justice Breyer states in part: "Trademarks
identify the source of a good; and infringement causes harm by causing
confusion among potential customers (about the source) and thereby diluting
the value of the mark to its owner, to consumers, and to the economy." 89 While
these statements arose in a concurrence, they are noteworthy for a number of
reasons. First, nothing in Justice Kennedy's or in the dissenting opinions
appears to depart from this understanding, and-in light of judicial precedent-
chances are that a majority of the court would likely subscribe to Justice
analysis of marks. To the contrary, related empirical studies may in fact turn out to weaken
claims for expansive rights for some types of marks.180 See Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, The "Artistic Relevance Test" Just Became
Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark
Infringement and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278 (2003). For a discussion of the use of
corporate brands for purposes of artistic or political expression, see Sonia K. Katyal,
Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 489, 492-95 (2006).
181 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256-57
(4th Cir. 2007) (upholding summary judgment in favor of a plush dog chew toys
manufacturer accused of diluting a brand associated with luxury handbags).
182 Empirical studies of the hedonic value of brands will yield new insights and shape
trademark law in the commercial context, but I currently do not foresee that they will
significantly alter the current balance between doctrines like dilution and uses that receive
First Amendment protection. Any expansion of trademark rights has to take into account the
effects on both economic and hedonic utility but also the value of living in a society that
enjoys broad free speech rights. I would like to thank Lisa Ramsey for the conversation we
had on this subject.
183 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
184 For a general discussion of this topic, see Rebecca Tushnet, The Stolen Valor Act and
Advertising/Trademark Law, REBECCA TUSHNET'S 43(B)LOG (June 28, 2012, 12:16 PM),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/06/stolen-valor-act-and.html.
185 132 S. Ct. at 2551.
186 1d. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
187 Id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting).
188None of these statements form part of the actual holding of the case, of course, and
so all conclusions derived from them contain some level of speculation as to the Court's
future holdings.
189 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Breyer's views on this point; relevantly, we know that a total of five Justices,
and hence a majority, signed onto either Justice Breyer's concurrence or Justice
Alito's dissent.190 Justice Alito specifically provides a likely endorsement when
he states that "[i]t is well recognized in trademark law that the proliferation of
cheap imitations of luxury goods blurs the 'signal' given out by the purchasers
of the originals."'91 Second, Justice Breyer writes about recognizing the harm
of dilution to not only owners and the economy generally but also consumers
specifically.
One wrinkle, as Rebecca Tushnet and others have commented,192 is that
Justice Breyer is not entirely clear when he says that "trademark statutes are
focused upon commercial and promotional activities that are likely to dilute the
value of a mark. Indeed, they typically require a showing of likely confusion, a
showing that tends to assure that the feared harm will in fact take place."193 The
dilution portion of the Lanham Act actually does not require "a showing of
likely confusion" but rather defines dilution as "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark." 94 Tushnet states: "Either Breyer is deeply
confused about what trademark law currently is and how infringement and
dilution' are proven, or he sees much better than we admit in reducing trademark
law to dilution and presumptions to proof."' 95 I see a few possible
interpretations of Justice Breyer's statement. For one, he was not necessarily
wrong by suggesting that most trademark cases ("typically") revolve around a
showing of confusion. For another, I would draw a distinction between
requiring a risk of harm and presuming proof. As mentioned previously in this
Article,196 trademark law is not unique in the difficulties that it presents when it
comes to measuring harm. And to the extent someone should bear the risk of
that harm, it is not clear why that burden should fall on the producer and
consumers of the original good. Odds are that Justice Breyer was speaking in
some generalities, but the message is clear: he, Justice Alito, and likely at least
several of the other Justices-while some of them willing to strike down the
False Valor Act-have no intention to let the First Amendment become a fatal
hurdle to dilution and related doctrines.
190 The way that the case unfolded procedurally is that a total of four Justices signed on
to Justice Kennedy's opinion, two Justices to Justice Breyer's opinion, and three Justices to
Justice Alito's dissent. Id. at 2541. I would like to thank Will Baude for his comments on
this point.
191 Id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 184.
193 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
194 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006). Barton Beebe has explained that "[w]hile
trademark infringement involves the infringement of source distinctiveness, trademark
dilution involves the dilution of differential distinctiveness." Beebe, supra note 23, at 676.
19 5 Tushnet, supra note 184.196 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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Further, while Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alvarez does not directly
discuss trademarks, it gives us another clue as to the Court's views on the
matter. Justice Kennedy writes that "[t]he remedy for speech that is false is
speech that is true"197 and suggests, in the context of the Constitution's
requiring the alternative least restrictive of speech, that the government could
establish a database that lists the winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor
and hence counteracts fictitious claims such as the ones by the respondent.198
When it comes to infringing or diluting speech in the trademark context, there is
little to no opportunity for effective counterspeech, which is another important
distinction between the Stolen Valor Act and the Lanham Act. This provides
further evidence that the current Court, building on existing precedent, is
unlikely to shake up the status quo that has left dilution and related doctrines
largely unscathed by First Amendment challenges, although it may still strike
down individual problematic applications of dilution law in this context.199
The expressive content of Gucci burgers is likely trivial in most contexts,200
and the First Amendment neither does nor necessarily should protect this use of
a competitor's mark. There will certainly be borderline cases of various sorts,
but it is difficult to envision why or how the Constitution would bar dilution and
related doctrines as an absolute matter. The real debate will continue to be about
how extensively concepts like fair use201 or parody should apply.202 This
197 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550.
198 Id. at 2551.
199 1 thank Rebecca Tushnet for her comments on this point.200 For what it is worth by way of anecdotal data, the owner of the one place of which I
know that currently sells Gucci burgers in Maine fairly clearly displayed no particular
attachment to the name when I spoke to him on the phone. He said that someone came up
with the idea in a meeting and it stuck, and it sounded to me as if it was no more than a
"cool" name to him without significant expressive content. See supra note 25. Of course,
this is just my interpretation of a short phone conversation and should be taken as such.
201 When it comes to nominative fair use, for instance, it is unlikely that empirical
studies of hedonic values will change our perspective in that uses in that realm are unlikely
to reduce consumers' hedonic appreciation of the original goods by enough to overcome the
sometimes significant benefits of such uses.
202 Another debatable topic is how exactly to interpret the fame requirement of dilution
law. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in
Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 89, 94 (2011) (proposing that proof of fame should
consist, at minimum, of recognition on the part of seventy percent of the American public).
An interesting point to consider within that question and as related to hedonic analysis is
what types of marks suffer the most from dilution. Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby have
suggested that "some brands, such as Continental Airlines, are so familiar to
consumers .. . that recall of their original product category is largely immune to trademark
dilution." Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 52, at 272. This suggests that some of the most
famous brands might be initially resistant to dilution, though this may be limited to a fairly
small subset of relevant brands (Continental Airlines produced perfect recall by the control
group) and could change if the level of dilution becomes more significant than that used in
the study, which would not take much. See id Also, while stronger brands may be slower to
experience dilution, they will often likely become subject to hedonic loss on the part of
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parallels some of what one can observe in copyright law, where we ultimately
also disallow non-deceptive forms of speech if they breach the boundaries of
fair use, whether this takes place for a commercial purpose or not.203 For
instance, we do not let someone photocopy and distribute a hundred pages out
of a Harry Potter novel, even if she prints "Not endorsed by J.K. Rowling" on
the cover and no matter whether the aim is to profit financially or to make a
greater political or artistic statement. 204 While not conclusive, the evidence we
have from legal precedent in trademark cases, the Supreme Court's recent
statements in Alvarez, and the parallels to copyright law thus suggest that
current dilution law and related doctrines fit within the rest of our First
Amendment jurisprudence and intellectual property generally.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article set out to accomplish several goals. One was to uncover the
hidden variable in the trademark violation equation, namely consumers'
hedonic appreciation of marks, and how it affects doctrines such as dilution,
sponsorship confusion, post-sale confusion, and initial interest confusion. It has
shown, subject to further empirical investigation, that the first three may be
directly tied to the concept of hedonic loss while the last one contains a tenuous
link at best. It has critiqued some of the main schools of thought in the
trademark world and has shown how they do not account for consumers'
experience of marks, which is an integral part of their experience of the
products that contain the marks. Trademarks are The Matrix's equivalent of not
a blue or red but rather a purple pill because in the world of brands, experience
is reality, entirely or at least as a tightly intertwined element. If one of the main
roles of trademarks is to protect the quality-indicating function of marks, then
all relevant qualities should matter. While dilution and some related doctrines
consumers more significantly than lesser known (yet still famous) brands. Some of this may
be related to whether a brand has acquired what Alex Wipperflirth has termed consumer
"loyalty" (think of a true fan of Southwest or JetBlue Airlines) as opposed to fleeting
"retention" (an example of which would be someone who sticks with United or American
Airlines for the frequent flyer benefits but would not mind switching at the drop of a hat).
See WIPPERFORTH, supra note 19, at 248-55. Odds are that companies that achieve loyalty
generally do so by providing greater amounts of long-term hedonic benefits. If dilution takes
place early on in the trajectory of an otherwise successful emerging brand, that brand may
never even have the opportunity to work toward said loyalty, although there are also possible
opportunity costs in the other direction (e.g., as mentioned previously, dilution could force
the original owner to become more creative). For a discussion of the effect of dilution at
different points in time in the relationship between a producer and consumer, see supra note
95.
203 I would like to thank Mark McKenna for the conversation that we had on this
subject.
204 If nothing else, this type of use would undoubtedly fail the prong of the fair use test
that evaluates "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
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may have come about in part due to mark owners' political efforts targeted
toward ensuring maximal profitability from existing, well-known trademarks,
owners have thus possibly also indirectly served as protectors of consumers'
experiences and global welfare. Whether they have done so optimally remains
to be seen as we seek out and publicize more empirical data on different types
of hedonic gains and losses.
The dichotomy between deceptive trademark infringement, such as in cases
involving likelihood of confusion at the point of sale, and non-deceptive
infringement such as dilution is insignificant in many respects. The hypothetical
Gucci burgers and their brethren potentially risk harming the original brands by
altering consumer perception without an equivalent hedonic upside. Whatever
theoretical argument can be made that this may favor creativity by competitors
is countered by one that creativity may actually suffer due to the promotion of
unoriginality. This Article does not attempt to delineate the exact contours of
optimal trademark infringement law, but it rather argues that dilution,
sponsorship confusion, and post-sale confusion are normatively relevant
concepts in an intellectual property framework based on utilitarian notions. The
thesis here thus pushes back against the story that cleanly aligns dilution with
producers' interests and lack thereof with consumers'.
The ideal for lawsuits by trademark owners is that they culminate in gains
for both the plaintiffs and their consumers. 205 The next step after embracing the
importance of hedonic enjoyment to trademark law should be an empirical
exploration of the proper boundaries of dilution and related doctrines and of
what level of enforcement can best balance the protection of current hedonic
values and the need for competition and expression. I am agnostic as to the
outcome of empirical studies examining the hedonic gains and losses resulting
from possible dilutive and other questionable uses. 206 This Article contends,
however, that the outcomes of such studies ought to influence our thinking
about trademark policy and the crafting of related statutes and doctrines. The
model presented here is thus both a return to the roots of trademark law and a
somewhat radical departure from the existing scholarly discourse. It is a return
in that it forces consideration of the most fundamental goals of trademarks, and
I have argued in this Article that this should explicitly include not only the
maximization of economic utility but also of hedonic enjoyment. The model is a
departure because it embraces values that many other scholars have discarded as
meaningless atmospherics outside the purview of trademark law. As author
Clarence Day has stated, however, "information's pretty thin stuff, unless mixed
with experience." 207 Modem trademark law seeks to ensure that the consumer
205 Trademark owners are likely the most logical enforcers in such cases due to their
interests in the litigation and their larger resources, but they also serve as "the public's
avengers." Dilbary, supra note 64, at 629.
206 We may, for instance, find that hedonic losses are significant for dilutive uses of
luxury brands but not for those of other famous but non-luxury brands.
207 CLARENCE DAY, JR., THE CROW's NEST 4 (1921). The original context of the
quotation is an indictment of ivory-tower thinking, in the form of a description of book
282 [Vol. 74:2
HEDONIC TRADEMARKS
both gets the experiences he wants and wants the experiences he gets, and that
is how it should be.
lovers who got to heaven: "[T]hey sat in the harp store-room all eternity, and read about
heaven. They said they could really learn more about heaven, that way. And in fact, so they
could. They could get more information, and faster. But information's pretty thin stuff,
unless mixed with experience." Id.
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